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2022 Supreme(J&K) 160

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT JAMMU
Rajnesh Oswal, J.
Rajinder Kumar and Anr. - Petitioners
Versus
Manav Chouhan and Anr. - Respondents
MA No.36/2019 (O&M) c/w CPC No.2/2019
Decided On : 22-04-2022

Advocates Appeared:
For the Petitioner:Mr. Pawan Kumar Kundal, Advocate.
For the Respondent:Mr. Sunil Kumar Maini, Advocate.

Headnote:

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2-Interim injunction-Trial court while considering issue with regard to prima facie case, has conducted a mini trial and has returned a finding upon merits of case and has rejected contentions of appellants raised in written statement, one by one-While deciding application for grant interim relief, trial court is not required to conduct a mini trial-It is not the case where appellants have no defence at all as appellants have raised certain defences to right of prior purchase projected by respondents in suit-There are serious issues those require trial but trial court should have stopped there only and not proceeded further to determine merits of claims of both parties. While examining balance of convenience, comparative mischief/inconvenience of parties is required to be weighed and not desire of party to purchase property in a particular position- This in fact suit for enforcement of right of prior purchase and it is not that sale deed is absolute nullity, that does not confer any right upon appellant No.2-Similarly, it cannot be said that irreparable injury shall be caused to respondents if injunction against construction is refused as respondents can either retain construction or appellant No. 2 can be directed to pull down construction raised by her-Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss exists in favour of respondents but so far as interim relief with regard to raising of construction over suit property is concerned, balance of convenience does not lie in favour of respondents but in favour of appellant No. 2 as on date of filing of suit, ownership as well as possession of suit property is borne from record-All three essential requirements i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury must co-exist and then only interim injunction can be granted-Merely having a prima facie case is not enough for grant of interim injunction-Order granting interim injunction partly upheld. (Paras 9, 10, 12, 13 and 14)

Result-Appeal Partly allowed.

JUDGMENT :

Rajnesh Oswal, J.

This Civil 1st Miscellaneous Appeal has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 28.02.2019 (hereinafter referred to as the impugned order), passed by the Court of learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Jammu, (hereinafter referred to as the trial court) in an application for grant of interim relief filed in civil suit titled “Manav Chohan and another vs. Rajinder Kumar and another” by virtue of which the order dated 01.01.2019 granting interim injunction has been confirmed by the learned trial court.

2. The order has been assailed on the following grounds:

(i) That the learned trial court has not considered the aspect pertaining to title of the respondents with regard to the House No. 496 and as such the respondents had no right of prior purchase with respect to the suit house bearing no 497, as one Bindu Gondi has already filed the suit with regard to House No. 496 on the basis of memorandum of family settlement.

(ii) That the order impugned is liable to be set aside on the ground that the Jammu Municipal Corporation, has laid down steps/lanes over the common path that is alleged to be common outer entrance by the respondents and, as such, the respondents have no right of prior purchase with respect to the suit property. More so, there are sewerage holes and drainage in the common path.

(iii) That the order impugned is liable to be set aside on the ground that the respondents have approached the learned trial court in the year 2019 to seek declaration with respect to the sale deed dated 03.03.2018, but the fact is that prior to the aforesaid sale deed, two more sale deeds dated 12.07.1990 and 04.07.1991 have been executed with respect to the suit house and the respondents in order to cover their delay and latches have concocted a false and frivolous story and as such, the respondents have no right to seek declaration with respect to the sale deed dated 03.03.2018.

(iv) That the order impugned is further liable to be set aside on the ground that suit of the respondents is hit by Section 5(b) of the Right of Prior Purchase Act, because there is a deity of the appellant No. 2 in the suit property

(v) That the order impugned is also liable to be set aside on the ground that respondents did not approach the learned trial court when the appellant No. 2 had started laying down whole structure of the suit property and when the whole structure of suit property was laid down by the appellant No. 2 and over which shuttering was installed, then only the respondents approached the trial court for grant of prohibitory injunction. It is because of ex-parte interim order, the appellant No. 2 stopped the construction over the suit property, thereby subjecting irreparable loss to the appellant No. 2. It is also stated that respondents have no prima-facie case in their favour as the title of the respondents was not clear.

3. Mr. Pawan Kundal learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the appellants had taken specific plea with regard to the non-existence of right of prior purchase with respondents as both the houses were not having a common entrance but, there is a common passage and on the same, Municipal Corporation, Jammu has laid down tiles and made sewerage holes. He further argued that the respondents have not challenged the earlier two sale deeds executed with regard to the suit property and now respondents cannot enforce any right of prior purchase in the suit property. He also urged that the respondents filed the suit only when the appellant No. 2 had placed shuttering and it was only by the permission of this court that the appellant No. 2 removed shuttering because it was causing financial burden upon appellant No. 2 due to operation of the order of the learned trial court imposing restrictions upon the construction. He further vehemently argued that the learned trial court has fallen into grave error of law while rejecting prayer of the appellant No. 2 for permitting her to raise

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