2023 Supreme(J&K) 245
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH AT SRINAGAR
N. KOTISWAR SINGH, M.A. CHOWDHARY, JJ.
Parvez Ahmad Nengroo, S/o. Mohd Amin Nengroo - Appellant
Versus
Union Territory of Jammu & Kashmir through Commissioner/Secretary to Government, Finance Department & Ors. - Respondents
LPA No. 168 of 2020 (in WP(C) No. 470 of 2020), CM Nos. 304 of 2022 & 6874 of 2020
Decided On : 01-11-2023
For the Appellant : Mr. Shariq J. Reyaz.
For the Respondents:Mr. D.C. Raina, Advocate General with Mr. Sajad Ahsraf, G.A., Mr. Sunil Sethi, Senior Advocate with Mr. Parimoksh Seth, Mr. Nitin Parihar.
The main legal point established is that a contractual appointment, not governed by service rules, falls outside the purview of writ jurisdiction, making a writ petition challenging such appointment not maintainable.
Headnote:
Writ Petition - Contractual Appointment - Pension Regulations - Summary Dismissal - Deemed Retirement
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a senior functionary in the J&K Bank Ltd., was appointed as Chairman & CEO for a three-year tenure. He was later removed from the position by the government and informed that he was deemed to have retired from the service of the Bank. The appellant challenged his removal and the communication of deemed retirement through a writ petition.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the appellant's appointment as Chairman & CEO was contractual in nature and not governed by the service rules of the Bank. The court held that the writ petition was not maintainable to determine the appellant's removal and deemed retirement, as it fell outside the purview of writ jurisdiction.
Issues: The main issues were the contractual nature of the appellant's appointment, the applicability of pension regulations, and the maintainability of the writ petition to challenge his removal and deemed retirement.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the appellant's appointment was contractual and not subject to service rules, making the writ petition not maintainable for determining his removal and deemed retirement. The court also noted the principle of 'Approbate and Reprobate' in the appellant's conduct.
Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the impugned judgment was upheld. The court found no grounds for interference in the decision of the writ court.
JUDGMENT :
M.A. Chowdhary, J.
1. This letters patent appeal under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is directed against the judgment/order dated 11.11.2020 rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court [ for short ‘Writ Court’] dismissing the Writ Petition registered as WP(C) No.470/2020 preferred by the appellant/petitioner, in limine, as not maintainable and relegating the appellant/petitioner to approach the civil court for seeking enforcement of his contractual relationship and/or redressal of his contractual disputes with the Bank.
2. The appellant/petitioner has challenged the impugned judgment on the following grounds :
A. For that the impugned judgment and order dated 11.11.2020 is vitiated in law for in contradistinction to the succinct and the legally substantiated case as set up by the Appellant in the Writ Petition, the impugned judgment embarks on unfortunate mis-adventurism and has erroneously dismissed the Writ Petition not on the grounds urged by the Appellant or for that matter even on the grounds taken in opposition by the Respondents but proceeds on wholly erroneous assumptions and conjectures that has in sequel thereto resulted in absolute miscarriage of justice;
B. For that the learned Single Judge while rendering the impugned Judgment has erred in law in not appreciating that the Respondent No.2-Bank being a Public Authority is in the matter of employment/service matters subject to constitutional obligation limitations therefore, any cause accruing to an employee in relations to matter of employment/service falls clearly in the realm of Public Law and not Private Law, the impugned judgment in so far it declines the relief prayed for by the Appellant in the writ petition entitled though ex-debito-justitiae and relegates the Appellant to private law remedy and thus the impugned judgment in sequel thereto has been rendered bad and unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside/reversed;
C. For that the learned Single Judge while rendering the impugned judgment has conveniently ignored the case set up by the Appellant in its totality and has, while cherry picking lines and divorcing them from the context, led to the unwarranted and anachronistic conclusion that the Appellant has admitted in the writ petition that the Appellant has deemed to have retired from the service of the Respondent No.2-Bank;
D. For that as a matter of fact substantiated by the records that no such admission direct or implied has been made and/or can be said to have been made by the Appellant herein, rendering in sequel thereto the impugned judgment as well as the view taken and the conclusion drawn as being without any basis and therefore, bad and unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside;
E. For that the learned Single Judge while rendering the impugned judgment has erred in law in not appreciating in its true and correct perspective the unequivocal and unambiguous compensation policy of the respondent No.2 Bank that admits of no doubt vis-à-vis the continuation of pensionary benefits to serving management including Chairman and whole-time directors and in sequel thereto is rendered bad and unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside/reversed;
F. For that the learned Single Judge has completely misdirected in point of law when under gross misconstruction of the compensation policy it is held that such compensation policy was not applicable to the Appellant when as a matter of fact the Appellant being the Chairman and CEO was amongst the serving management of the Respondent No.2 Bank and was hence entitled to contribution towards pensionary benefits on account of continued service in the Respondent No.2-Bank. The impugned judgment on this court as well is rendered bad and unsustainable in law and thus liable to be set aside/reversed;
G. For that the impugned judgment suffers from ex-facie perversity in as much as it under gross misconception/misconstruction of the compensation policy as well as the factum of contribution made by the