The main legal point established in the judgment is that for an act to warrant preventive detention on the grounds of public order, it must directly and inevitably lead to a harm, danger, or alarm among the general public or any section thereof at large.

JUDGMENT :

1) The petitioner, through his father Nazir Ahmad Sofi, has challenged his detention ordered by District Magistrate, Baramulla - respondent No.2 herein, in terms of order No.04/DMB/PSA/2023 dated 07.02.2023. Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner has been placed under preventive detention with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order.

2) Before adverting to the grounds of challenge urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner impugning the order of detention, it is apt to notice the material facts on the basis of which the detaining authority has derived its subjective satisfaction for placing the detenue under the preventive detention. As per the grounds of detention the petitioner is alleged to have a criminal bent of mind and under the garb of being a political activist has extorted money from general public, particularly unemployed youth on the pretext of providing government job to them by issuing fake and forged appointment orders. It is alleged in the grounds of detention that on 11.01.2023, two persons, namely, Shabir Ahmad Mian and Naseer Ahmad Malla belonging to Pattan staged a protest on the ground that they are feeling insecure because of the activities of the petitioner. After the information was received by the police about the illegal activities of the detenue FIR No.17/2023 for offences under Section 420, 384, 506 IPC was registered against the petitioner and he was accordingly arrested. At the time of framing the grounds of detention, the detenue was shown to be on Police Remand. It is also stated that under the garb of political affiliation, the petitioner has involved other people in his anti-social activities, misused his liberty and accomplished his anti-social activities successfully. It is on the basis of the allegations contained in the FIR, the detaining authority arrived at subjective satisfaction to detain the detenue in order to restrain him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The detaining authority, thus, found it imperative to detain the detenue by invoking Section 8 of the J&K Public Safety Act and it is in the aforesaid backdrop, the impugned detention order has been passed against the detenue and he has been lodged in Central Jail, Kotebhalwal, Jammu.

3) Upon being put to notice, the respondents appeared through their counsel and filed their reply affidavit, wherein they have disputed the averments made in the petition and insisted that the activities of detenue are highly prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is pleaded that the detention order and grounds of detention along with the material relied upon by the detaining authority were handed over to the detenue and the same were read over and explained to him. It is contended that the grounds urged by the petitioner are legally misconceived, factually untenable and without any merit. That the detenue was informed that he can make a representation to the government as well as to the detaining authority against his detention. It is further claimed in the reply affidavit that all statutory requirements and constitutional guarantees have been fulfilled and complied with by the detaining authority and that the order has been issued validly and legally. The respondents have produced the detention record to lend support to the stand taken in the counter affidavit.

4) The impugned order of detention has been challenged by the petitioner on several grounds. However, during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has laid much emphasis on the ground that the detaining authority has relied upon the allegations contained in FIR No.17/2023 for offences under Section 420, 384 and 506 IPC for indulging in cheating which, if found proved against the detenue, would constitute a criminal act and said criminal act can, by no means, be treated as an act to harm the public order.

5) I have learned counsel for the