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2003 Supreme(Jhk) 1042

Jharkhand High Court
Gurusharan Sharma,Lakshman Uraon, JJ.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
Union Of India - Respondent
LPA 412 Of 2002
Decided On : 25 August, 2003

Headnote:Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Section 2(k) – Industrial Dispute – High Court has jurisdiction to entertain a writ, it there be allegation that either there was no industrial dispute within the meaning of section 2(k) and non – apprehended which may be subject matter of reference u/s 10 – if there is no industrial dispute State Government can not make any reference – appeal allowed. (Para 12)

ORDER

1. This appeal has been preferred by M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Limited (hereinafter referred to as the BCCL) against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 18.7.2002, passed in CWJC No. 2775 of 2000(R), whereby Reference No. 32 of 1998 dated 30.6.1998, made by the Central Government was not interfered with.

2. It is not in dispute that some time in the year 1973 certain lands belonging to private persons were acquired by M/s. BCCL on payment of consideration amount. Subsequently in the year 1978 a circular was issued, whereby those persons, whose 2 acres agricultural land or 3 acres non- agricultural lands were acquired by M/s, BCCL, were entitled to get employment of one person by way of compensation, besides the consideration amount.

3. Jharkhand Colliery Sharmik Union, a trade Union registered under the Act, in the year 1996, raised an Industrial dispute on behalf of those land-owners, whose lands were acquired by M/s. BCCL in the year 1973 and the Central Government being the appropriate Government, referred the following dispute for adjudication to the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1, Dhanbad, under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).

"Whether the demand of the Union for the employment of land losers as per the enclosed annexure by the management of M/s BCCL is justified ? If so, to what relief are these persons entitled ?

4. M/s. BCCL challenged the said reference in this Court, vide CWJC No. 2775 of 2000(R), raising the questions whether the land owner concerned can be said to be workman, within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act and the dispute as referred can be termed as a dispute as contemplated under Section 2(k) of the Act. Besides this, at any rate the reference was a stale one.

5. It is not in dispute that the Jharkhand Colliery Shramik Union is a trade union, duly registered under the Act and the persons on whose behalf the Union raised such dispute for reference were neither the employees of M/s. BCCL nor were claiming their employment through the workman thereof, in terms of the National Coal Wage Agreements or under any Rule or circular.

6. The claim raised on behalf of the land owners, whose lands were acquired are loosely called Land losers are private individuals and, therefore, the two questions raised against the reference as to whether an Industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act relating to their claim of employment could have been referred to under Section 10 of the Act and that too at the instance of a trade union at such a belated stage.

7. In this regard, it is relevant to quote Section 2(k) of the Act. "Industrial dispute" means any dispute or difference between employers and employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person.

8. The definition of the word Industrial Dispute indicates a dispute connected with non-employment between the employers and the workman as also of any person. Now the question is whether a dispute in relation to a person who is seeking employment neither through a workman nor in terms of any circular or order applicable in his case can be treated within the expression of any person occurring in third part of the definition clause.

9. This question was considered by the Apex Court in Workman of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353, wherein it was observed that definition under Section 2(k) did not contain any word of qualification or restriction in respect of expression any person occurring in third part and if any limitation as to its scope are to be imposed they must be such as can be reasonably inferred from the definition clause itself or other provisions of the Act. The expression any person, therefore, cannot mean anybody and everybody in the wide world. Secondly, the de









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