1. Termination of a non-workman employee — Dispute raised by workmen — Question of whether such dispute constitutes an industrial dispute under Section 2(k), Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 )
Back
Next 
1958 Supreme(SC) 2
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
4th February, 1958.
S.R. DAS, C.J.I., S.K. DAS AND A.K. SARKAR, JJ.
Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, Appellants
Versus
Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate, Respondent.
Civil Appeal No. 297 of 1956.
Advocates appeared
Mr. C. B. Aggarwala Senior Advocate, Mr. K. P. Gupta Advocate, with him, for Appellants; Mr. Purshottam Tricumdas Senior Advocate, for Mr. N. C. Chatterjee Senior Advocate, Mr. P. K. Goswami, Senior Advocate, M/s. S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, Advocates, with them, for Respondent.
Advocates:
B.N.GHOSH, C.B.AGARWAL, K.P.GUPTA, N.C.CHATTERJI, P.K.GOSWAMI, PURSHOTTAM TRIKAMDAS, S.N.MUKHERJEE
B.N.GHOSH, C.B.AGARWAL, K.P.GUPTA, N.C.CHATTERJI, P.K.GOSWAMI, PURSHOTTAM TRIKAMDAS, S.N.MUKHERJEE
The expression "any person" in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is limited to persons in whose employment or non-employment the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest, based on the principle of community of interest.
Headnote:(A) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 2(k) - Definition of "Industrial dispute" - Section 2(s) - Definition of "Workman" - Interpretation of the expression "any person" - A dispute between employers and workmen connected with the non-employment of a person who is not a "workman" - The expression "any person" cannot be given its ordinary meaning without limitation - It must be read in the context of the scheme and objects of the Act - The crucial test is whether the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest in the employment, non-employment, or terms of employment of that person - Community of interest is the real nexus between the dispute and the parties. (Paras 8, 9, 14, 15, 21)
(B) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 - Section 18 - Binding nature of awards - The fact that an award may not be binding on the person concerning whom the dispute is raised does not automatically mean the dispute is not an industrial dispute. (Paras 12, 39)
(C) Dissenting View - The words "any person" should be given their plain and ordinary meaning - The discretion of the government to refer the dispute for adjudication serves as the necessary filter to prevent misuse of the Act. (Paras 53-55)
Facts of the case:
An assistant medical officer was appointed on probation and subsequently terminated. The workmen of the establishment, represented by a trade union, raised a dispute regarding the termination. The appropriate government referred the dispute to a Tribunal. The Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal held that since the employee was not a "workman" as defined under the Act, the dispute did not constitute an "industrial dispute," and the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
Findings of Court:
The employee belonged to the medical or technical staff and was not a "workman." The workmen had no direct or substantial interest in his employment or non-employment. Therefore, the dispute did not fall within the scope of Section 2(k).
Issues: Whether a dispute in relation to a person who is not a "workman" within the meaning of the Act falls within the scope of the definition of "industrial dispute" contained in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
Ratio Decidendi: The expression "any person" in Section 2(k) must be read subject to limitations arising from the context and objects of the Act. A dispute is an "industrial dispute" only if the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest in the employment or non-employment of the person concerned. The "community of interest" of the class of workmen furnishes the necessary nexus.
Result: Appeal dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Whether the expression any person in Section 2(k) includes all employees or is restricted to those in whom workmen have a direct or substantial interest. (Para 8 , 13 , 27 , 29 )
3. Interpretation of any person requires context and the Act's object — Crucial test is the community of interest and direct or substantial interest of the workmen. (Para 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 , 14 , 15 , 21 )
4. A dispute concerning a non-workman is an industrial dispute only if the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest in that person's employment. (Para 14 , 21 )
5. Appeal dismissed — Termination of a non-workman employee without direct or substantial interest of the workmen does not constitute an industrial dispute. (Para 22 , 23 , 58 )
6. Does the expression any person in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, include every individual regardless of their status?
No. The expression must be read in the context of the Act's object and scheme. It is limited to persons in whose employment or non-employment the parties to the dispute have a direct or substantial interest. (Para 9 , 14 , 21 )
7. What is the crucial test to determine if a dispute regarding a non-workman is an industrial dispute?
The crucial test is one of community of interest. The person regarding whom the dispute is raised must be one in whose employment, non-employment, terms of employment, or conditions of labour the workmen as a class have a direct or substantial interest. (Para 14 , 15 , 21 )
8. Why does the Act use the term any person instead of any workman in the definition of industrial dispute?
The wider term was used to ensure that disputes regarding workmen discharged prior to the dispute itself—who might not strictly fit the definition of workman at the time—could still be considered industrial disputes. (Para 14 )
Judgment
S. K. Das, J.: This appeal by special leave raises a question of some nicety and of considerable importance in the matter of industrial relations in this country. The question is the true scope and effect of the definition clause in S. 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The question has arisen in the following circumstances.
2. The appellants before us are the workmen of the Dimakuchi tea estate represented by the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha, Dibrugarh. The respondent is the Management of the Dimakuchi tea estate, district Darrang in Assam. One Dr. K. P. Banerjee was appointed assistant medical officer of the Dimakuchi tea estate with effect from November 1, 1950. He was appointed subject to a satisfactory medical report and on probation for three months. It was stated in his letter of appointment:
"While you are on probation or trial, your suitability for permanent employment will be considered. If during the period of probation you are considered unsuitable for employment, you will receive seven days notice in writing terminating your appointment. If you are guilty of misconduct, you are liable to instant dismissal. At the end of the period of probation, if you are considered suitable, you will be confirmed in the garden s service."
In February 1951 Dr. Banerjee was given an increment of Rs. 5/- per mensem, but on April 21, Dr. Banerjee received a letter from one Mr. Booth, manager of the tea estate, in which it was stated:
"It has been found necessary to terminate your services with effect from the 22nd instant. You will of course receive one month s salary in lieu of notice."
As no reasons were given in the notice of termination, Dr. Banerjee wrote to the manager to find out why his services were being terminated. To this Dr. Banerjee received a reply to this effect:
"The reasons for your discharge are on the medical side, which are outside my jurisdiction, best known to Dr.Cox but a main reason is because of the deceitful manner in which you added figures to the requirements of the last medical indent after it had been signed by Dr. Cox, evidence of which is in my hands."
3. The cause of Dr. Banerjee was then espoused by the Mangaldai Circle of the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha and the secretary of that Sangha wrote to the manager of the Dimakuchi tea estate, enquiring about the reasons for Dr. Banerjee s discharge. The manager wrote back to say that Dr. K. P. Banerjee was discharged on the ground of incompetence in his medical duties and the chief medical officer (Dr. Cox) had found that Dr. Banerjee was incompetent and did not have sufficient "knowledge of simple everyday microscopical and laboratory work which befalls the lot of every assistant medical officer in tea garden practice." It was further stated that Dr. Banerjee gave a faulty, inexpert and clumsy quinine injection to one Mr. Peacock, an assistant in the Dimakuchi tea estate, which produced an extremely acute and severe illness very nearly causing a paralysis of the patient s leg. The reasons given by the manager for the termination of the services of Dr. K. P. Banerjee did not satisfy the appellants herein and certain conciliation proceedings, details whereof are not necessary for our purpose, were unsuccessfully held over the question of the termination of the service of Dr. Banerjee. The matter was then referred to a Board known as the tripartite Appellate Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner, Assam, and two representatives of the Assam branch of the Indian Tea Association and the Assam Chah Karmachari Sangha respectively. This Board recommended that Dr. Banerjee should be reinstated with effect from the date of his discharge. After the recommendation of the Board, the respondent herein appears to have offered a sum equal to 28 month s salary and allowances in lieu of re-instatement; to this, however the appellants did not agree. In the meantime, Dr. K. P. Banerjee received a sum of Rs. 306-1-0 on May
