2004 Supreme(Jhk) 862
Jharkhand High Court
P.K.Balasubramanyan,Hari Shankar Prasad, JJ.
Udayanchal Seva Santhan - Appellant
Versus
State Of Jharkhand - Respondent
LPA 476 Of 2004
Decided On : 23 August, 2004
Headnote:Constitution of India – Article 226 – Termination of contract to maintain Sullabh Shauchalaya in Deoghar Municipal area is a disputed question which van not be decided under writ jurisdiction – appeal dismissed (para - 5)
P.K. Balasubramanyan, C.J.
1. This appeal by the petitioner in WP (G) No. 3076 of 2004 challenges the dismissal of the writ petition by the learned single Judge mainly on the basis that the dispute arose out of a contract and the dispute cannot be settled satisfactorily in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, The petitioner in the writ petition (hereinafter referred to as the appellant) is a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860. On 13.1.1988, the Special Officer, Deoghar Municipality issued a letter to the appellant informing it that six Sulabh Sauchalayas were being handed over to the appellant for its control and management and that a rent of Rs. 25,000/- had been fixed annually and on terms and conditions set out. Pursuant to that letter, the appellant was carrying on the maintenance of the Sulabh Sauchalayas. This arrangement was being continued by letters issued annually to the appellant. The appellant took charge of the maintenance of seven Sulabh Sauchalayas for the period 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2002 on a rental of Rs. 32,500/-. The arrangement was again continued on the same terms for the period 1.4.2002 to 31.3.2003. According to the appellant, a sum of Rs. 33,250/- was paid by it for the same right for the period 1.4.2003 to 30.3.2004. On 30.3.2004. the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 36,000/- to the Special Officer, Deoghar Municipality (the municipality having been superseded and Special Officer having been appointed in terms of Section 381 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922) apparently for the period 1.4.2004 to 31.3.2005. The case of the appellant is that while the appellant was performing its obligations under the arrangement, an advertisement was issued calling for tenders for the purpose of maintaining the Sulabh Sauchalayas in Deoghar referred to in that notification. It was challenging that notification that the appellant filed the writ petition. According to the appellant, there was an attempt to breach the contract by respondent No. 4 who was apparently acting at the behest of the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar and hence the action was improper, the advertisement was liable to be quashed and a direction was liable to be issued to the respondents to permit the appellant to carry on its operations. It was this writ petition that was dismissed by the learned single Judge after hearing the parties on the ground that the dispute sprang out of a contract and it was not appropriate for this Court to enter into an adjudication. The Court also noticed that this being the month of Shrawan during which the Temple at Deoghar has special importance and it attracts lakhs of pilgrims, it would be inappropriate to interfere with an attempt to settle the maintenance of the Sulabh Sauchalayas for the benefit of the pilgrims.
2. The decision of the learned single Judge is challenged by the appellant on the ground that the contract between the appellant and the Municipality was subsisting and the said contract cannot be terminated unilaterally by the Municipality and that too, without an independent assessment by the Municipality but on the basis of certain Instructions issued by an outside authority, namely the Deputy Commissioner. The principles of the decision in Commissioner of Police v. Gordhandas, AIR 1952 SC 16, was relied on. It was also contended that the learned single Judge could have seen that the practical aspects involved made it necessary for the Court to Interfere so as to enable the appellant to continue the work since the stopping of the work of maintaining the Sulabh Sauchalayas would cause serious inconvenience to the pilgrims during the month of Shrawan and any Interference with the working of the contract by the appellant would result in serious prejudice to the public. It was also contended that before issuing the notification impugned in the writ petition, there was not even a termination of the running contract with the appellant. It was also pointed