The main legal point established in the judgment is the limitations of the power of review, the statutory remedy of appeal, and the need to maintain parity between two sets of certificate debtors.

1. The present review application has been filed for review/recall of the judgment and order dated 14.03.2018 passed in W.P. (C) No. 1234 of 2017 by which the writ petition was disposed of as not maintainable at that stage, giving liberty to the petitioner to file an appeal in terms of section 60 of Bihar and Orissa Public Demand Recovery Act, 1914 (as adopted by the State of Jharkhand).

2. The fact of the case, in nutshell, is that the petitioner and Jharkhand State Food And Civil Supplies Corporation Limited, Sahibganj entered into an agreement for milling of paddy by lifting it from the LAMPS and production of custom milled rice. The petitioner lifted some quantity of rice from the LAMPS, Pakur and supplied the custom milled rice to the Food Corporation of India, Pakur however the same was rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner did not lift the paddy from LAMPS alleging the poor quality of the paddy. After the inquiry, The District Cooperative Officer, Pakur vide letter no. 381 dated 20.09.2016 requested the Joint Secretary, Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Department, Government of Jharkhand to permit Pakur LAMPS to sell the remaining paddy grains for the purpose of returning the fund to the State Government. The Secretary, Food, Public Distribution Department vide letter no. 4226 dated 20.10.2016 directed the Deputy Commissioner of all districts in the State of Jharkhand including Pakur district to take all steps for realization of the amount given to LAMPS for purchase of paddy grains. Thus, so far as Pakur district is concerned, a certificate proceeding vide Certificate Case No. 46 of 2016-17 was initiated and the order of realization of an amount of Rs.47,13,630/- was passed against both the LAMPS, Pakur and the present petitioner.

3. A writ petition being W.P.(C) no. 1234 of 2017 was filed by the present petitioner challenging the initiation of certificate proceeding. During the pendency of the writ petition, the order dated 01.08.2017 was passed by the Additional Collector cum Certificate Officer, Pakur (respondent no. 3) in Certificate Case no. 46 of 2016-17 which was also subsequently challenged by filing I.A No. 6592 of 2017.

4. The said writ petition was disposed of with the following observations:-

“I find force in the said submission of the learned G.A. It appears that another writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 5773/2016 filed by Pakur Large Area Multi Purpose Society (LAMPS) Ltd. Pakur, through its member secretary-cum-manager, Shyamal Kant Saha, who is the co-certificate debtor in Certificate Case No. 46/2016-17, has already been disposed of by a coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 17.08.2017 in view of availability of the efficacious remedy for redressal of the grievance by way of filing of appeal under section 60 of the Act, 1914. The present writ petition, which is arising out of the similar transaction, cannot be entertained on merit at this stage. Accordingly, to maintain parity between two sets of certificate debtors, though both may have their own contentions against the action of the State-respondents, it seems appropriate that the petitioner should avail the statutory remedy of appeal before the appellate authority in terms with Section 60 of the Act, 1914. The present writ petition is thus not maintainable at this stage. However, it is observed that if the petitioner files an appeal under section 60 of the Act, 1914 by 30th April, 2018, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner for realization of the dues. If the petitioner files an application for stay in the said appeal, the appellate authority shall consider the same and pass appropriate order in accordance with law at the earliest. The appellate authority shall also consider the application for condonation of delay keeping in view of the fact that the present writ petition remained pending before this Court for about a year. It is, however, made clear that this Court has not expressed any view on the merit of this