JUDGMENT :

GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J.

1. The Insurance Company has preferred the instant appeal against the judgment and award of compensation in M.A.C.T. Case No. 16 of 2006 under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, whereby and whereunder compensation has been awarded for the death of deceased Ibrahim Ansari who died in a motor vehicle accident on 14.04.1988.

2. The appeal has been preferred mainly on the ground that as per the claimant’s case the accident took place on 14.04.1988 whereas the claim case has been filed in the year 2006 under Section 110A(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939 after more than 17 years of the accident. Under the old Act there was a specific period of limitation of six months for filing the claim application and, therefore, the instant claim is hopelessly barred by limitation. As per the original provision of Section 166 of the 1988 Act there was a period of limitation of six months from the date of the accident for preferring the appeal which was completely done away with by deleting Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1988 w.e.f. 14.11.1994.

3. It is submitted that permitting old and stale cases to be filed was not the object of deleting the limitation by the 1994 Amendment Act. Reliance has been placed on M/s. Purohit and Company vs. Khatoonbee and Another, 2017 (0) AIR (SC) 1612, wherein it has been held that only a live and surviving claim can be said to be genuine of the claimant must approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time. In that case a period of 28 years was held to be not reasonable for filing the claims application.

4. It has been held in Vinod Gurudas Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 333 at page 337 that even independent of the General Clauses Act, it is firmly established that unless a new statute expressly or by necessary implication says so, it will not be presumed that it deprives a person of an accrued right. On the other hand, a law which is procedural in nature, and does not affect the rights, has to be held to be retrospectively applicable. The question is whether the appellant has been deprived of an accrued right or privilege in the present case. It is true that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act - subject to two conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy.

5. Here in the present case the claim application has been filed about 17 years after the accident which cannot be said to be reasonable by any stretch of imagination. There is no explanation for the delay. The question of limitation was raised before the learned Tribunal, but neither issues were framed on limitation matter nor any reason has been assigned for not considering the issue of limitation matter. The object of the 1994 Amendment Act was not intended to open the floodgate for admitting claim cases which took place in remote antiquity. It is for this reason that Hon’ble Supreme Court in Purohit case (supra) in no uncertain terms held that claimant must approach the Tribunal within a reasonable time. I find and hold that the claim application was filed after unreasonable delay with respect to the accident that took place before the Amendment Act came into force