JUDGMENT

SHARMA, J.:—Special leave is granted.

2. The appellant was injured in a road accident and his claim petition has been dismissed as being barred by limitation. The accident took place on 22-1-1989. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was repealed by S. 217(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into force on 1-7-1989. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act being six months expired on 22-7-1989. The claim petition of the appellant, however, was filed belatedly on 15-3-1990 with a prayer for condonation of delay. The Accident Claims Tribunal held that in view of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of S. 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, the delay of more than six months could not be condoned. The application was accordingly dismissed. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the High Court.

3. It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act, and his petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act.

4. The period of limitaion for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident. The difference in the two Acts. which is relevant in the present case, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay. In view of the proviso to sub-sec. (3) of S. 166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six .months, which expired on 22-1-1990. If the new Act is held to be applicable, the appellants petition filed in March had to be dismissed. The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no such restriction as in the new Act. The question is as to which Act is applicable; the new Act or the old.

5. It has been contended by the learned counsel that under the old Act the appellant had a right to file a claim petition even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, and this right is preserved by reason of the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Reliance has been placed on Cls. (c) and (e). The relevant portion of the section reads thus:-

"6. Effect of repeal- Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

a) and b).....................

c) affect any right; privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

d)......................

e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, for- feiture or punishment as aforesaid:

and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may beimposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."

We are unable to agree. Cl. (c) is not attracted because, by the enactment of the new law the remedy of the appellant has not been affected at all. His right to claim compensation by filing the claim within the same period of limitation has been preserved. And there was no application for condonation of delay in a proceeding pending at the time of repeal so as to allow him to claim any privilege available under the old Act. So far the applicability of Cl. (c) is concerned, the question depends on whether the appellant had got an accrued right or privilege under the old law which he could not have been deprived of by the repealing legislation.

6. Even independent of the General Clauses Act, it is firmly established that unless a new statute expressly or by necessary implication says so, it will not be presumed that it deprives a person of an