The main legal point established in the judgment is that repossession of vehicles must be conducted through legal means and not by force, as emphasized in the case of ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Prakash Kaur and Others.

JUDGMENT :

1. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel assisted by Mr. Ajay Sah, the learned vice counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Mr. V.S. Sahay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent State and Mr. S.K. Sharma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the O.P.No.2.

2. This petition has been filed for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding initiated against the petitioners in connection with Complaint Case No.230 of 2000, corresponding to T.R.No.823 of 2004 for the offences punishable under sections 417, 427, 120B of the Indian Penal Code including the order dated 20.08.2003 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class at Chatra.

3. That the complainant is the registered owner of Tata truck bearing registration No.BR-13B-0021. The vehicle was purchased on 17.04.1997 through finance. At the time of purchase, the total consideration amount was Rs.4,97,701/- and out of which the complainant paid Rs.1,51,000/- and the rest amount was to be repaid in equal monthly installments. It is further alleged that till 08.07.2000 out of total consideration amount of Rs.4,97,701/- the complainant had paid Rs.4,73,168/- through cash or demand draft. It is further alleged that accused no.2 to 5 happens to be the agent of accused no.1, having impersonated themselves and took away the truck of the complainant along with the driver and conductor on the pretext that the said truck is being seized and is being taken with the help of police.

4. It is further alleged that the vehicle in which accused nos.2 to 5 went did not have registration number and therefore, the complainant along with his brother followed the vehicle and saw that the accused persons fled away by handing over the vehicle to the Officer-incharge of the Bundelkhand Police Station.

5. The complainant narrated the entire story to the Officer in charge of Bundelkhand Police Station whereafter finding the complainant to be the owner of the vehicle the said vehicle was released in favour of the complainant on 17.9.2000.

6. The Cr.M.P. was allowed by the coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 21.12.2007 and the entire criminal proceeding was quashed and such order was challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court by order dated 26.07.2013 has been pleased to set aside the order of this Court and remanded the matter back to decide the matter afresh after hearing the parties. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered that since even the cognizance has not been taken under section 406 IPC and the High Court on the premises of section 406 IPC has proceeded and quashed the proceeding and in that view of the matter the order dated 12.12.2007 was set aside and the matter was remanded back to this Court to decide the matter afresh.

7. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submits that the case has been registered under section 379, 417, 427 and 120B of the IPC and the learned court has been pleased to take congnizance on 20.18.2003 under section 417, 427 and 120B of the IPC. He submits that the case of the petitioners is that the petitioner no.1 happens to be partner of the firm and the petitioner no.2 who happens to be employee of the firm. He submits that there is bald allegation against these petitioners in the complaint petition however the learned Court has taken cognizance under section 417, 427, 120B IPC. He further submits that the vehicle in question was financed by the petitioners and the installment was not paid and pursuant to that the vehicle was re-possessed however subsequently it was released in favour of the O.P.No.2 by police personnel. He further submits that the case is arising out of an agreement and there is an arbitration clause and the arbitration clause has been invoked and the Award has been passed in favour of the petitioners which was challenged before the competent court under section 34 of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act which was dismisse