The grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code cannot be cancelled solely on the ground of non-fulfilment of compromise terms.

JUDGMENT :

This petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 25.07.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in connection with Jorapokhar P.S. Case No.111 of 2011, G.R. Case No.1744 of 2011, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner was on bail and by the impugned order dated 25.07.2012, his bail was cancelled on the petition filed by opposite party no.2. He further submits that the petitioner is ready to appear before the learned court on any date fixed by this Court. He also submits that in absence of any cogent reason, the impugned order has been passed which is not in accordance with law. He submits that identical was the situation in the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Biman Chatterjee v. Sanchita Chatterjee and another; [(2004) 3 SCC 388], wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court, which has cancelled the bail. He relied upon paragraph 7 of the said judgment.

3. Paragraph 7 of the said judgment is quoted herein below:

“7. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in cancelling the bail on the ground that the appellant had violated the terms of the compromise. Though in the original order granting bail there is a reference to an agreement of the parties to have a talk of compromise through the media of well-wishers, there is no submission made to the court that there will be a compromise or that the appellant would take back his wife. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the courts below could not have cancelled the bail solely on the ground that the appellant had failed to keep up his promise made to the court. Here we hasten to observe, first of all from the material on record, we do not find that there was any compromise arrived at between the parties at all, hence, question of fulfilling the terms of such compromise does not arise. That apart, non-fulfilment of the terms of the compromise cannot be the basis of granting or cancelling a bail. The grant of bail under the Criminal Procedure Code is governed by the provision of Chapter XXXIII of the Code and the provision therein does not contemplate either granting of a bail on the basis of an assurance of a compromise or cancellation of a bail for violation of the terms of such compromise. What the court has to bear in mind while granting bail is what is provided for in Section 437 of the said Code. In our opinion, having granted the bail under the said provision of law, it is not open to the trial court or the High Court to cancel the same on a ground alien to the grounds mentioned for cancellation of bail in the said provision of law.”

4. Learned counsel for opposite party no.2 submits that there was no compromise with the petitioner, however by way of suppressing this fact, he has obtained bail and that is why, the learned court has cancelled the bail of the petitioner. He submits that there is no illegality in the impugned order.

5. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the Court has gone through the impugned order and finds that the learned court has been pleased to cancel the bail of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not fulfilled the terms and condition of compromise. Identical was the situation before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Biman Chatterjee (supra) and the case of the petitioner is fully covered in light of that judgment.

6. In view of the above facts, the order dated 25.07.2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad in connection with Jorapokhar P.S. Case No.111 of 2011, G.R. Case No.1744 of 2011, pending in the court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad is, hereby, set aside. The petitioner is directed to appear before the learned court on or before 05.04.2023. Since the petitioner was already on bail and bail bond was of the year 2012, the petitioner is allowed to re