The main legal point established in the judgment is the determination of the appellant's employment status and the applicability of the definition of 'establishment' under The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953.

JUDGMENT :

Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.

Learned counsels for the parties are present.

2. This Letters Patent Appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 23rd July 2018 passed in W.P.(L). No.3661 of 2016 whereby the writ petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed.

3. The writ petition was filed for the quashing of orders dated 20th October 2014 and 04th February 2016 passed in Bihar Shops and Establishment Case No.01 of 2003 and Miscellaneous Case No.01 of 2016 passed by the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur whereby the claim of the writ petitioner/appellant for dues/wages, as well as compensation, has been rejected.

4. The appellant filed a case before the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur under the provisions of The Bihar Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1953) which was numbered as B.S. & E Case No.1 of 2003. In the said case, the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of M/s Tata Iron and Steel Company Limited (TISCO) was the respondent no. 1 and TISCO now Tata Steel Limited was respondent no.2.

5. This is the case of the appellant that she was employed in the Community Development and Social Welfare Department of M/s Tata Steel Limited which was a unit of respondent no.2. The wages were not paid to the appellant for the period from June 2002 to February 2003 @ Rs.1,415/- per month and, apart from non-payment of wages for the period of her medical leave, she was not allowed to rejoin the service. Her further grievance was that the benefits applicable to the Tata Steel Limited employees were not being paid to her, although, she had worked all along under the control of management of Tata Steel Limited. The appellant sought a direction in term of section 28 (2) of the Act of 1953 for payment of wages amounting to Rs.12,735/- for the period from 01st June 2002 to 28th February 2003 @ Rs.1,415/- per month and compensation amounting to 10 times of the estimated value which came to Rs.1,27,350/-, total being Rs.1,40,085/-. The appellant further prayed for a direction upon the respondents to pay the difference of wages and other benefits which were payable to the appellant which she should have received as an employee of Tata Steel Limited right from the beginning of her service. The said claim of the appellant was opposed by the respondents.

6. Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence before the learned Labour Court. However, the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur dismissed the claim of the appellant on the ground that the application under section 28 of the aforesaid Act of 1953 was not maintainable against Tata Steel Limited as it was not an establishment and also on the ground that the appellant was not being paid any wages but only ‘honorarium’. The appellant filed a review petition which was also dismissed. The appellant challenged both the aforesaid orders before the learned writ Court which has been dismissed by the impugned order.

Arguments of the Appellant

7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has referred to the definition of “establishment” as defined under section 2(6) of the Act of 1953 and has submitted that the establishment in which the appellant was working is covered within the said definition. The learned counsel has submitted that the learned Labour Court as well as the learned writ Court has not considered this aspect of the matter. He has referred to a judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Vs. Chief Inspecting Officer and others” (2005) 9 SCC 605 and has submitted that with respect to the hospital maintained by Tata Steel Limited, it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the hospital falls within the definition of “establishment” as defined under the aforesaid Act of 1953. He has submitted that the aforesaid judgment was not placed before the learned writ Court but it may be considered by this Court as the point involved in the present case is squarely covered by the said jud