The court emphasized that sufficient cause for delay must be interpreted liberally, but revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised for issues already adjudicated by a coordinate bench.

JUDGMENT :

(SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD , J.)

1. The instant application filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Cr.P.C. assailing the order dated 05.03.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder, the prayer for discharge from criminal prosecution in connection with R.C.03(A)/2011-R, has been rejected.

I.A. No.9880 of 2023

2. Since the instant case is barred by limitation of 1234 days and as such, the delay condonation application being I.A. No.9880 of 2023 has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay of 1234 days in filing the instant petition.

3. The reason has been explained at paragraph-4 of the instant application showing therein that the cause has been said to be sufficient in not approaching the Court by challenging the order impugned dated 05.03.2018 and since, it was pending for its consideration in interlocutory application being I.A. No.3913 of 2018 which had been filed in W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012.

4. It has been submitted that the said W.P.(Cr.) No.211 of 2012 was dismissed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court on 05.05.2023 without passing any order on I.A. No.3913 of 2018.

5. The present revision petition has been filed after passing of the order dated 05.05.2023 and as such, the delay has been caused of 1234 days.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that by applying the principle as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, the explanation, so furnished at paragraph-4, is treated to be sufficient cause to condone the delay.

7. Mr. Deepak Kr. Bharati, learned counsel for the Opp. Party-CBI has opposed the ground shown for the purpose of condoning the delay.

8. The affidavit in opposition has also been filed.

9. It has been contended that the delay is in the nature of inordinate delay of 1234 days and as such, the same may not be condoned.

10. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties.

11. This Court is conscious with the issue of consideration of delay condonation while exercising the power conferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein, the underlying principle is that the parties concerned are aggrieved with the order, which is to be questioned, if has been able to show the sufficient cause and certainly the delay is to be condoned so as to enter into the merit of the issue. Contrary to that if the sufficient cause has not been shown by the party concerned, then, certainly the delay is not to be condoned.

12. This Court, before appreciating the reason which has been shown in the instant interlocutory application, needs to refer the definition of “sufficient cause”.

13. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’. The consideration of meaning of ‘sufficient cause’ has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court tha