Judgment.- An interesting question has arisen in this civil revision petition. One Rokkaiya Ammal was the owner of a property a portion of which was let out to the petitioner. It is not in dispute that the petitioner is actually in occupation of a thatched bunk of an extent 5 x 4. The landlady filed an application under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, on the ground that the petitioner had committed wilful default and also on the ground that she wanted the leased premises for her husband’s business of making articles from zinc and iron sheets. The Rent Controller ordered eviction on both the grounds. The appellate authority was not convinced that there was wilful default in the payment of rent, but he was, however, satisfied that the landlady was entitled to the possession of the building for purposes of her husband’s business. In the course of the hearing of the appeal, the landlady died and her husband, her son and her daughter were brought on record and the appeal proceeded with the above three persons as her legal representatives and resulted in a decision in their favour. The petitioner-tenant has come up in revision to this Court. During the pendency of the revision petition, the husband of the landlady died leaving behind the son and daughter as the legal representatives of the landlady to continue the proceedings.

2. Mr. Chandra Mouli, learned counsel for the petitioner, takes up the position that as the husband of the landlady died, though at the revision stage, the purpose for which the building was required by the landlady having lapsed, the respondents as the surviving legal representatives of the landlady are not entitled to the benefit of the order of eviction obtained by her in both the Courts below. He would say that once a landlady conies to Court on the ground that a portion in the occupation of the tenant is required for the landlady or for her near and dear, as provided under the Act and if she obtains an order of eviction but dies in the course of such proceedings, the Cause of action does not survive, to the benefit of her legal representatives and such legal representatives could only seek relief by filing an independent application as provided for under the Act, on the new facts and circumstances which have cropped up due to the death of the landlady. Mr. Kumaraswamy, learned counsel for the legal representatives on record before me, however, would say that there is no such snapping of the cause of action by reason of the death of the original landlady and that, in any event, if the landlady dies after she obtains an order of eviction and if the said decision is questioned before the higher hierarchy, then it would be in the fitness of things that the legal representatives should take advantage of the decision obtained by the landlady earlier and it is not necessary for them to file an independent application for the same relief, as if a different set of circumstances have cropped up due to the death of the landlady.

3. A personal action dies with the person is a well established principle. Even that doctrine has certain exceptions. In a case where a litigant seeks for a statutory relief in relation to property and obtains it after satisfying the statutory Tribunal that he or she is entitled to that relief, then that decision which projects a right becomes annexed to the property of that litigant who initiated the action and it cannot be divested by invocation of any technicalities. The mother in the instant case wanted that her husband should do business and therefore the petitioner-tenant should surrender possession to enable her husband to do such business. The son and daughter who are before me express their candid intention to continue that business of their father by occupying the shed in the occupation of the petitioner. On the facts, therefore, there does not seem to be any doubt whatever that the son and daughter intend carrying on the business of the

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