Judges should exercise self discipline.

Markandey Katju, CJ.

This writ appeal has been filed against the impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 15.10.2004.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

3. The writ petition had been filed before the learned single Judge against the order of the CEGAT dated 09.07.1997.

4. We are surprised that this writ petition was entertained at all. There was a clear alternative remedy against the order of the CEGAT dated 09.07.1997 by means of filing a Reference Application before the CEGAT under Section 35G(1) of the Central Excise Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) and if that application was rejected by the CEGAT there was a second alternative remedy of approaching this Court under Section 35G(3) of the Act seeking a direction to the CEGAT to make a reference to this Court.

5. It is well settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that particularly in tax matters there should be no short circuiting of the statutory remedies, vide Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar Vs. Dunlop India Limited, AIR 1985 SC 330, etc.

6. It is well settled that when there is an alternative remedy ordinarily writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the constitution should not be invoked. This principle applies with greater force regarding tax proceedings. As observed by the Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603:

“Where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of.

7. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in G.Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained code and itself provides for a forum for appeal/revision, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provisions. A similar view was taken in Assistant Collector of Central Excise Chandan Nagar Vs. Dunlop India Limited, AIR 1985 SC 330.

8. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar Vs. Dunlop India Limited (Supra) the Supreme Court observed:

“In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 A.P.Sen, E.S.Venkataramiah and R.B.Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art. 226 of the Constitution. But, then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely, matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution are filed solely for the purpose of obtaining interim orders and thereafter prolong the proceedings by one device or the other. The practice certainly needs to be strongly discouraged.”

9. In C.A.Ibraham Vs. ITO, AIR 1961 SC 609, H.B.Gandhi Vs. M/s.Gopinath & Sons, 1992 (Suppl) 2 SCC 312 and in Karnatak Chemical Industries Vs. Union of India, 2000 (10)