The burden of proof on the purchaser to establish bonafide purchase for value without notice, as per Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act, and relevant case laws were central to the judgment.

(Second Appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree, dated 30.06.1993, made in A.S.No.8 of 1990 on the file of District Judge, Pudukkottai.)

The plaintiff, who has filed the suit for specific performance, is the appellant. He filed the above suit against respondents 1, 2 (Defendants 1 and 3) and one M.Subramaniam (Died), defendant No.2 in the suit. Respondents 3 to 6 are the legal representatives of the deceased Defendant No.2. The trial court decreed the suit. The first appellate court reversed it and restricted the decree to a part of the suit property holding that the remaining parts being two shops had been purchased by respondents 2 and husband of Respondent No.3 on the ground that they are bonafide purchasers for value without notice. This second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law.

"Whether the Lower Appellate Court had erred in placing onus of proof on the plaintiff to establish that the defendants 2 and 3 are not bonafide purchasers for value without notice of the suit agreement".

2. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ex.A-1 sale agreement, which is sought to be enforced, was found to be genuine by both the courts below. The case of the first respondent was that the appellant had fraudulently obtained an agreement from her in respect of the entire property, whereas what she intended to convey to him was only one shop, namely, the shop in respect of which the appellant was in possession. At this juncture, it must be stated that the suit property consists of three shops. The appellant, respondent 2 and the husband of respondent No.3 were all tenants under the first respondent and each in possession of one shop. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that inspite of this defence taken by the first respondent in the written statement, both the courts have found that the document was genuine. Therefore, what is follow is that there was an agreement between the parties to sell all the three shops to the appellant. Once that finding has become final, there would be no justification to restrict the decree to one shop. The learned counsel submitted that the respondents had not proved that they were bonafide purchasers for value without notice.

3. The learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the appellate court had correctly found that the appellant had deliberately obtained this sale agreement Ex.A-1 secretly and without knowledge of respondent No.2 and the husband of respondent No.3 in respect of all the three shops, whereas that was never the intention of the first respondent. The learned counsel submitted that the pleadings and the evidence would clearly show that the second respondent and the husband of third respondent are bonafide purchasers.

4. Ex.A-1 sale agreement is dated 20.06.1983. On 11.09.1983, the appellant issued a notice calling upon the first respondent to execute the sale deed, since she was postponing the execution of registration of the sale deed. There was no reply and, therefore, the appellant sent a telegram on 15.09.1983 expressing his willingness and readiness and requesting the first respondent to execute and register the sale deed on the very same day. The first respondent refused to receive the telegram. In paragraph 4 of the plaint it is stated that respondent No.2 and the husband of respondent No.3 were aware of the sale agreement and in fact, the appellant had objected to their purchasing the suit property when he came to purchase the suit property. According to the pleadings, respondent 2 and the husband of the third respondent are not bonafide purchasers. The first respondent, after filing written statement, remained ex-parte. According to her, the agreement between the parties was to sell that portion to the person in occupation. Therefore, what was intended to be sold was the three shops to three persons, namely, the appellant, respondent No. 2 and the husband of respondent No.3