The main legal point established in the judgment is that even if a termination order appears simple and innocuous, the court must consider the real intention behind it and ensure that the employee is given a proper opportunity before arriving at conclusions. Justice should not only be done but should also appear to have been done.

In W.P.No.19169 of 1999, the petitioner, who was the erstwhile Executive Director – Marketing on probation in Hindustan Photo Films Manufacturing Company Limited (H.P.F.), seeks for a Certiorari to quash the impugned order dated 29.11.1999, terminating the probationary services of the petitioner. Subsequent to the impugned order, he responded to the circular issued by the Public Enterprises Selection Board for the post of Managing Director of M/s.Spices Trading Corporation Ltd. He was called for the interview. But as a result of the information received by the Public Enterprises Selection Board and Spices Trading Corporation from H.P.F. regarding the termination of probationary services of the petitioner, he was informed not to appear for interview. As a result, in W.P.No.9842 of 2000, the petitioner has prayed for a declaration to declare the exclusion of the petitioner from the selection process for the post of Managing Director of M/s.Spices Trading Corporation Limited as illegal and void and to direct the respondents to hold a fresh selection for the post of Managing Director by also considering the petitioner's claims.

2. In W.P.No.19169 of 1999, the crucial issue being the legality or otherwise of the order of termination of the petitioner's probation and in view of my ultimate conclusion that the impugned order is stigmatic and hence liable to be set aside, I feel that it will not be necessary to deal with the elaborate pleadings by both parties on issues which do not have much relevance to the validity of the impugned order.

3. Detailed pleadings have been submitted and elaborate arguments were made on the circumstances relating to the petitioner's appointment, how he was functioning and how he was treated by the Management during the period of probation.

4. Mr.Prakash, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petitioner belongs to Adi Karnataka community and from the beginning, he was treated very badly, not given proper treatment or facilities which are normally available to the post to which he was appointed. Even the basic facilities were denied to him and the Chairman and Managing Director, who has been impleaded by name as the first respondent, was, from the beginning, treating the petitioner very badly and deliberately in a manner not permitting the petitioner to function in an effective manner. He would also explain in detail that the commissions or omissions or shortcomings attributed to the petitioner were not only false, but arose only out of circumstances designed by the the C.M.D., not permitting the petitioner to discharge his duties in an effective manner. Learned counsel also took me through the records in support of his contention that the termination was not a simpliciter termination of probation, but highly stigmatic.

5. Per contra, Mrs.Rita Chandrasekaran, appearing for respondents-1 and 2 in W.P.No.19169 of 1999, would state in detail that the performance of the petitioner was not only very much below expectations, but also that the attitude of the petitioner was always confrontational and indulging in a series of intemperate and disrespectful behaviour. In spite of such behaviour, the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to improve himself by granting one extension of the probationary period with the hope that he would improve himself. If the C.M.D. really wanted to do away with the petitioner, such an extension need not have been given. But, as the petitioner did not register any improvement during the extended period also, there was no other alternative except to terminate the probation. Learned counsel also contends that the impugned order is a simpliciter order of termination and no stigma is attached to the said order. Though elaborate submissions have been made, I intend to avoid dealing with such factual contentions inasmuch as this case may be disposed of on the short ground that the impugned order is stigmatic and hence, as it was not preceded by any enquiry, it is