The main legal point established in the judgment is that the appellants were precluded from raising a plea contrary to the terms of the agreement under Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the plaintiff's claim for specific performance was not bona-fide, disentitling her from the relief.

(Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 13.11.1995 in A.S.No.214 of 1984 on the file of this Court.)

F.M. Ibrahim Kalifulla, J.

The defendants are the appellants. Since the second appellant died during the pendency of this Appeal, the first appellant being the sole legal representative of the deceased first appellant, the Appeal is being pursued by the first appellant alone.

2. The respondent/plaintiff laid the suit for specific performance based on an agreement dated 23.8.1980 executed by the appellants/defendants for sale of the plaint schedule properties in favour of the respondent. Ex.A-1 is the agreement dated 23.8.1980.

3. The trial Court dismissed the suit holding that Ex.A-1 agreement was not intended to be acted upon. The respondent/plaintiff preferred First Appeal in A.S.No.214 of 1984 on the file of this Court. By judgment and decree dated 13.11.1995, a learned single Judge of this Court held that by virtue of Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, the appellants are precluded from raising a plea contrary to the terms of the agreement and therefore, the judgment and decree of the trial Court cannot be sustained and consequently decreed the suit filed by the respondent/plaintiff as prayed for, with costs. Hence, this Letters Patent Appeal by the appellants/defendants.

4. Brief facts which led to the filing of the suit can be stated as under:

According to the respondent/plaintiff, under Ex.A-1 dated 23.8.1980, the appellants/defendants agreed to sell the plaint schedule properties in favour of the respondent/plaintiff, that the price was fixed at Rs.15,000/-, that an earnest sum of Rs.9,300/- was also paid and the balance sum was agreed to be paid on or before 23.8.1983. It was also claimed by the respondent/plaintiff that she was given possession of the plaint schedule properties and that she was always willing to perform her part of the contract. It was further alleged that legal notices were issued on 1.7.1981 and 29.12.1981 and the appellants/defendants did not come forward to perform their part of the contract. The plaintiff therefore prayed for a decree to direct the appellants/defendants to perform their part of the contract by virtue of the agreement Ex.A-1 dated 23.8.1980 and execute the sale deed and in the absence of the appellants failing to execute the same, prayed the Court to execute the sale deed.

5. The appellants/defendants filed their written statement contending that the suit schedule properties originally belonged to one Kamireddi Subbiah, that he had two sons, namely Kamireddi Venkataraju and Kamireddi Sattiaraju, who partitioned among themselves under a partition deed dated 28.3.1947 and that is how the suit properties devolved on the share of Kamireddi Sattiaraju, who is the grandfather of the first appellant. It is also stated that the said Kamireddi Sattiaraju had two sons, namely Kamireddi Sathyanarayana and Kamireddi Subbarao and that the appellants are the son and wife of Kamireddi Subbarao, who succeeded to one-half of the suit schedule properties, while the other half belonged to Kamireddi Sathyanarayana. The appellants came forward with a specific plea in the written statement in paragraphs 6 and 7, which read as under:

"6. The defendants deny that they entered into an agreement of sale with the plaintiff on 23.8.1980. But the plaintiff's husband lent a sum of Rs.1,000/- on 9.12.1978 with interest at the rate of Rs.1.75 per month per Rs.100/- since he is a tenant under the defendants in respect of the item No.2 of the suit properties. The plaintiff's husband Kondamouri Venkateswara Rao is running a betel-nut shop in the said premises. The defendants asked the plaintiff's husband Kondamouri Venkateswara Rao to lend further a sum of Rs.5,400/- to them on execution of mortgage deed in respect of the suit properties. The plaintiff's husband agreed to lend, but he asked the defendants to execute an agreement of sale of the suit properties instead of executing a de