JANARTHANAM, J.

In all these actions, I rather feel, there is no need or necessity to advert to the facts of each case, inasmuch as, what is challenged is the alleged commission of offence by certain companies, under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Act No. 26 of 1881 as subsequently amended for short "the NI Act"), for dishonour of cheques on account of either of the two contingencies or eventualities, as contemplated therein, viz., "insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account of the person", or" it exceeded the amount arranged to be paid from the account of a person by an agreement with that bank"

for which, prosecution had been launched by preferring individual complaints before competent courts of jurisdiction purely on questions of law relatable to the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by raising the following grounds :

(1) The offence was committed by the company and not by the petitioner;

(2) The prosecution of the petition, without the company being made an accused, is not sustainable in law; and

(3) Even if the prosecution can be launched against the petitioner, the individual complaint is devoid of necessary averments to constitute the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. To put it otherwise, and that too specifically, what is sought to be projected, is in the absence of specific averment in the complaint, that the petitioner is either in charge of, and is responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business, or, the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer, the court, before which the complaint had been launched or filed, cannot take cognizance of the complaint. Even if the complaint so filed, prima facie, discloses that the cheque issued by the company had been dishonoured, for either of the two contingencies or eventualities as specified in section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and if cognizance had been taken, such complaint is liable to be quashed lock, stock and barrel, as not disclosing any offence having been made out.Points Nos. 1 and 2 so raised may now fall for consideration in the arena of discussion. Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act dealing with offences by companies, reads as follows:

"141. Offences by companies. - (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well is the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly :

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

Explanation. - For the purposes of this section, -

(a) 'company' means any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

(b) 'director' in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm."

By a cursory glance or look at the provisions of section 141, as extracted above, it is rather crystal clear that if an offence under section 138 is committed by a company for such commission of the offence, by the