Subsquent purchaser if has locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings.

MISHRA J.

A Bench of this Court in a batch of writ petitions in W.P. No. 865 of 1982 etc. and W.P. No. 3137 of 1983, etc. held in its judgement dated 8-1-1988 and 21-1-1988 that a subsequent purchaser of a property notified for acquisition under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, I of 1894 and then followed up by Section 6 declaration cannot have any locus standi to question the acquisition. Venkataswami, J. and Abdul Hadi, J. found however that they were unable to agree with the said view.

2. Speaking for the Bench in W.P. No. 865 of 1982, Mohan, J. (as he then was) observed :

"W. P. No. 865 of 1982. This is a case in which the petitioner with open eyes when the properties have been notified for acquisition by 4(1) notification and then followed up by Section 6 declaration which is conclusive under Section 6(3), has come to purchase the property and wants to say that he could question the validity of the acquisition. In support of the argument, a judgement reported in Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality, 1970 AIR(SC) 802, 1969 (3) SCC 769, 1970 ALJ 178, 1970 All(LJ) 178 : 1970 AIR(SC) 802, 1969 (3) SCC 769, 1970 ALJ 178, 1970 All(LJ) 178 is cited. The relevant paragraph on which reliance is placed, is paragraph 17 at page 805; that reads as follows:

It was urged by Mr. Hazarnavis on behalf of the Municipal Committee, Bhatinda, that the three appellants were purchasers of the lands claimed by them after the notification under Section 4 was issued and they had no right to challenge the issue of the notification. If, however, the notification under Section 4 was vague, the three appellants who are purchasers of the land had title thereto may challenge the validity of the notification. The appellants have spent in putting up substantial structures considerable sum of money and we are unable to hold that merely because they had purchased the lands after the issue of the notification under Section 4 they are debarred from challenging the validity of the notification, or from contending that it did not apply to their lands.

"3. Venkataswami, J. in the order of reference dated 15-2-1991 has upon this said :" *

Following the abovesaid ratio, the same Bench has taken the same view in W.P. No. 3137 of 1983. After going through the judgement of the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality 1970 AIR(SC) 802, 1969 (3) SCC 769, 1970 ALJ 178, 1970 All(LJ) 178 ), we are unable to agree with the view taken by the earlier Division Bench of this Court holding that the subsequent purchaser has no locus standi to file the writ petition at all. Such a proposition as stated above is too broad in our opinion, having regard to the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality, 1970 AIR(SC) 802, 1969 (3) SCC 769, 1970 ALJ 178, 1970 All(LJ) 178 : 1970 AIR(SC) 802, 1969 (3) SCC 769, 1970 ALJ 178, 1970 All(LJ) 178.

There is a mention in the order of reference of the judgement of this Court in Kuppuswamy v. Spl. Tahsildar (LA), 1967 I MLJ 329 in which a learned single Judge of this Court has taken the view that the agreement-holder can challenge the land acquisition proceedings as he stepped into the shoes of the original owner.

4. Article 226(1) of the Constitution nowhere states that the High Court could exercise its power to issue writs only on an application of a person aggrieved. There is no such inhibition even for the exercise of power of superintendence by the High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. This is a concept derived from the English decisions. In Dwarka Nath v. Income-tax Officer, Kanpur, 1966 AIR(SC) 81, 1965 (57) ITR 349, 1965 (3) SCR 536, 1965 (2) ITJ 218, 1954 AIR(SCR) 1122, 1965 (3) SCC 536, it has been explained by the Supreme Court that the founding fathers of the Constitution have designedly couched Art. 226 of the Constitution in a comprehensive phraseology to enable the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. In Jasbhai Desai v. Ro