2002 Supreme(Mad) 601
Madras High Court
PRABHA SRIDEVAN
R.Venkatapathy Naidu alias Thambu - Appellant
Versus
Devaraja Aiyar - Respondent
Decided On : 07/22/2002
Important Points
Subject
Property Law - Adverse Possession
Act Referred
Headnote
S. K. Raghunathan, for Appellants; K. Srinivasan, for Respondent.
2. One important physical feature that must be noted for deciding, this case is the location of the superstructure and the extent of the vacant land in the suit property. The Advocate Commissioner filed a report describing the suit property as ABCD. In the south-western corner there is the house bearing door No. 5/12. About 29 feet from the house on the eastern side is clean and the Advocate Commissioner has noted that it appears to be used by the persons, who were living in the house. Whereas all over the vacant site “Veli" thorns were spread. The Advocate Commissioner has noted the existence of an old latrine in the north-western corner which is in disuse and is unreasonable because of the thorny undergrowth. On the north-western corner there are remnants of an old compound wall. On the eastern side also, there were traces of the old compound wall. The Advocate Commissioner has noted that it is almost impossible to go across the property from one end to another, due to the existence of thorns. Though this is a second appeal, the Commissioner’s Report regarding the physical features has a bearing on the decision.
3. The fact that there was a Ginning Factory in the suit property is not really in dispute. It is also admitted that the respondent occupied the superstructure after it was vacated by the previous owner. According to the respondent, his occupation was adverse to the true owner whereas according to the appellants, it was by permission.
4. Mr. Raghunathan, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that to hold that there is adverse possession, there should be a clear pleading regarding the date from which adverse possession commences. The animus to hold against the true owner must also be pleaded whereas that has not been done in the instant case and according to the appellants, the respondent had entered possession promising that he would vacate whenever demanded. Therefore, there was no question of adverse possession. Further, he submitted that even assuming without admitting that the appellants had perfected title to the superstructure, the same cannot be said of the vacant land because there is no evidence of animus possidendi and one acre of land cannot be treated as appurtenant to the superstructure in a small area in one corner. According to the learned counsel, the Courts below had not considered the question of adverse possession correctly. He relied on Ponnaiyan v. Munian (died), (1995) 1 Mad LW 680; Natesan v. Chinnachi Kandar, (1996) 2 Mad LW 344 : (AIR 1996 Mad 468); Marwari Kumhar v. Bhagwanpuri Guru Ganeshpuri, (2000) 6 SCC 735 : (AIR 2000 SC 2629); S. Subba Reddiar v. Bhagyalakshmi Ammal, (1996) 2 Mad LW 31; Pazhamaruthai alias Marudamathu v. M. Subramaniam, (2001) 3 CTC 142 : (2001 AIHC 3128); Udayanasamy hevar v. Mootor Thevar, (2001) 1 Mad LJ 137; Pappammal (died) v. Valliammal (died), (1996) 2 Mad LJ 194 and State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 652.
5. Mr. K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submitted that it is admitted by the appellants that the respondent has been in possession from 1960. It is the respondent’s case that he held it adverse to the title of the true owner. When the appellants claim that it was permissive occupation, they should have proved permission. The learned counsel submitted that all the documents would show the enjoyment of the suit property by the respondent. He also submitted that in any event, the adverse possession is a finding of fact and cannot be disturbed in second appeal and therefore, there shall be no interference. The learned counsel relied on the following decisions:
(1) Arumugha Thevar v. Melavasaga Thevar, (1999) 3 Mad LW 621 : (1999 AIHC 2759); (2) Thangamani v. Santhiagu, (2000) 3 Mad LW 848 : (2001 AIHC 719); (3) Pa