A covenant for renewal of a lease is not uncertain or vague if it provides a working rule by which the parties can agree to a particular thing being done, such as having regard to the rents prevailing in the locality.

RAMAPRASADA RAO, J. :- The plaintiffs in O. S. No. 2434 of 1969 and the defendants in O. S. No. 98 of 1970 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras, are the appellants in both the appeals. The appellants shall be hereinafter referred to as Khivraj Chordia. The respondents in both the appeals are Esso Standard Eastern Inc. hereinafter referred to as Esso. They were the defendants in O. S. 2434 of 1969 and the plaintiffs in O. S. 98 of 1970, Khivraj filed a suit for recovery of vacant possession of the suit site from Esso on the foot that the period of lease granted to them under Ex. A. 1, dated 16-1-1959, has expired by efflux of time and that Esso was no longer entitled either under law or by contract to remain in possession of the suit site in the absence of a renewal of the lease as contemplated therein. The prior correspondence between the parties such as Exs. A.2 to A.7, discloses the mind of Khivraj Chordia to obtain vacant possession of the site, which Esso resisted on the ground that under the terms of the lease deed Ex. A. 1 and in particular under clause 3 (d) of the same, they were entitled to be in possession of the same, and that they were not liable to be evicted. In answer to the suit for possession, Esso filed a replicatory suit O. S. 98 of 1970 seeking for specific performance of the contract to renew the lease under the terms of Ex. A.1 for a further period of 10 years commencing from 1-2-1969. Esso's main contention is that clause 3 (d) of the lease reflects 'certain' terms, which would compel Khivraj Chordia to cause a renewal of the lease in accordance with the tenor of the terms therein and the mere circumstance that Khivraj and Esso would not mutually agree to a just rent to be paid by Esso during the extended period of the lease sought to be demised would not compel them to surrender vacant possession. Thus, Khivraj Chordia's suit for eviction was countered by a suit for specific performance by Esso. These two suits were tried together and a common judgment was rendered by the court below, who framed the following issues for trial: O. S. 2434 of 1969:

1. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover vacant possession of the suit property from the defendant?

2. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from claiming possession of the demised premises except in accordance with the terms of the lease agreement dated 16-1-1959?

3. Whether clause 3 (d) of the lease deed by and under which the option to renew is sought to be exercised is vague, inoperative and unenforceable?

4. To what relief, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled?

O. S. No. 98 of 1970

1. Whether the clause for renewal in the lease deed is void and inoperative due to vagueness?

2. Whether the defendants are liable to grant a renewal of the lease as claimed by the plaintiffs and if so what are the terms on which the renewal is to be granted?

3. Whether the clause for renewal cannot be enforced for want of mutuality?

4. What relief are the parties entitled to?

2. The learned Judge after interpreting the particular recital and covenant in Ex. A. 1, came to the conclusion that the suit for possession filed by Khivraj Chordia deserved a dismissal and that therefore of the Esso for specific performance merited a decree. In the result, he dismissed O. S. No. 2434 of 1969 and decree O. S. 98 of 1970, declaring that a rent of Rs. 2000 per month is the fair and reasonable rent, which in the circumstances, Esso should pay to Khivraj Chordia " and directed the latter to specifically perform the contract of lease by entering into lease with Esso for a period of ten years commencing from 1-2-1969 in respect of the suit site and made it clear that the other terms and conditions, other than clause 3 (d) as contained in Ex. A. 1, should be incorporated in the new lease deed to be executed as between the parties. He decreed the suit for specific performance with costs, but dismissed the suit for eviction without costs. As against this, the present two appeals have b