A person claiming a direct and present interest in the subject matter of the litigation is entitled to be impleaded as a party to the suit.

ORDER:- This revision petition is directed against the order of the lower Court refusing to implead the petitioner herein as a party defendant in O.S. 644 of 1966 filed by the first respondent herein. The first respondent filed the above suit for recovery of possession of certain properties from six persons on the ground that they were her lessees, and that they had not only committed wilful default in the payment of the arrears of rent but also repudiated their tenancies. The said suit was resisted by the said six persons on the around that they were not the tenants of the plaintiff-first respondent, but that they were the tenants under the petitioner herein. After filing of the written statement by the said six persons the petitioner filed an application to implead himself as a party defendant in the suit and that application has been dismissed by the lower court not only on the ground that he is an unnecessary party but also on the ground that he cannot be said to have any valid title to the suit property after considering the document filed by the petitioner along with his application under Order I, Rule 10(2), Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner is aggrieved against the said order passed by the lower Court.

2. The learned counsel for the petitioner puts forward a twofold contention that the lower court was in error in holding that the petitioner is an unnecessary party to the suit, and that in any event, the lower court was in error in dealing with the merits of the petitioner's case as regards title to the property on the scanty material produced at the stage of the application under Order I, Rule 10(2). As regards the second contention the petitioner's contention is well founded. The lower court has no justification to go into the merits of the claim of title put forward by the petitioner to the suit property. The learned counsel for the respondent also fairly concedes that the lower court may not be justified in going into the merits of the petitioner's claim for title at this stage. Hence the only question that arises in this revision is whether the petitioner is a proper or a necessary party to the suit.

3. Before dealing with the principle involved in a matter of this kind, certain facts relating to the present suit have to be noted. It appears that the first respondent went before the Rent Controller for eviction of the said six persons from the premises in question, and before the Rent Controller they contended that she was neither the owner of the property nor was she their landlady, and that the petitioner herein was the landlord in respect of the properties in their occupation. The Rent Controller held that there was a bona fide dispute as to title to the property, and therefore directed the parties to go before a civil court. The relief claimed in the suit by the first respondent herein is not only recovery of possession from the alleged tenants but also a declaration of her title to the suit properties. From the reliefs claimed in the plaint it is seen that the suit is not based on mere tenacy. In effect the first respondent wants to have her title declared in the presence of her alleged tenants who are denying her title, and not in the presence of the petitioner who is really her rival claimant on title. On these facts, the learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that the suit being really one for declaration of title, the other party who is setting up a rival claim of title is a necessary party to the suit, as any declaration which the first respondent may obtain against the alleged tenants will be quite ineffective, for the petitioner can always, in exercise of his right of ownership, proceed against the defendants who are her tenants for recovery of possession, and that to get an effective decree the first respondent must face the petitioner as a defendant in her suit. The petitioner's learned counsel relies on the decision in Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, AIR 1958 SC 886, wherein it has been he