Section 3 of the Government Grants Act prevails over the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act and the State of Madras is not bound by the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act unless this is expressly stated to that effect in the Act.

SADASIVAM J. :- These civil revision petitions have been directed by the learned Chief Justice to be posted before this Division Bench as they involve two questions of law of some importance, namely, whether Section 3 of the Government Grants Act of 1895 (originally called the Crown Grants Act) prevails over the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act 3 of 1922, and whether the State of Madras is bound by the provisions of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act unless this is expressly stated to that effect in the Act.

2. These civil revision proceedings arise out of petitions filed by four timber merchants carrying on business in Basin Bridge Road, Madras for fixation of fair rent under Section 7 (a) of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act 1922. It is an undisputed fact that the lands on which the timber depots are kept belong to the State of Madras and they have been leased out by the Corporation to the several timber merchants. The Government allowed the Corporation to lease their lands in the Basin Bridge Road to timber merchants, subject to their approval, on the condition that 50 per cent of the rent realised should be paid over by the Corporation to the Government. The rents collected from the timber merchants were increased from time to time and finally, at the beginning of 1953, the timber merchants were informed that the lease would be renewed only on condition of their paying a rent of Rs. 50 per ground, though the Standing Committee of the Corporation itself had suggested only Rs. 35 per ground. Oosman Hajee and Co. and Messrs. S. N. Vijayaraghavachariar succeeded in the Courts below in invoking their jurisdiction for fixation of fair rent and the State has preferred C. R. P. 1565 and 1799 of 1963. But in the other two revision petitions filed by M/s. Sundarsanam Iyengar and Sons, the Courts below took the opposite view that the provisions of the City Tenants Protection Act cannot be invoked for fixation of fair rent, in respect of the lands owned by the Government.

3. It was urged on behalf of the State, in the Courts below that the Corporation of Madras acted only as the agent of the Government in leasing the lands. In the appeals preferred by M/s. Sudarsanam Iyengar and Sons to the City Civil Judge, Madras, there is a specific finding that, the position which the Corporation occupies is only that of an agent subject to the control of the Government with regard to the acceptance of the terms of the lease." Even in the appeals preferred by the State of Madras against Oosman Hajee and Co. and M/s. Vijayaraghavachariar, the appellate Court has found in the penultimate paragraph of its judgment that 'all that the Government order provides is that the Corporation was entitled as the 'agent of the State of Madras to lease the properties in question on terms approved by the Collector," and it is in this view, the learned Principal City Civil Judge has considered the scope and effect of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act. Thus the finding of the lower appellate Court in all these cases that the Corporation acted as the agent of the Government in leasing the lands of the Government to the timber merchants is justified on the evidence on record and it correctly represents the jural relationship between the parties.

4. The common law of England is that the King's prerogative is illustrated by the rule that the Sovereign is not necessarily bound by statute law which binds the subject. This is further reinforced by the rule that the King is not bound by a statute unless he is expressly named or unless he is bound by necessary implication or unless the statute being for the public good, it would be absurd to exclude the King from it. It was pointed out in Director of Rationing and Distribution v. Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1960 SC 1355, that this was the law applicable to India also until the advent of the Constitution. It has been held in the above decision that the rule of interpretation of statut