Petition by landlord for stay of the latter proceedings.

V. Balasubrahmanyan, J.

1. This is a case in which one Ramudu applied for remission of rent arrears from one Varada Iyengar on the footing that by reason of his being a cultivating tenant in a flood-or drought-affected area, he is entitled to relief under Tamil Nadu Act XVI of 1980 (Tamil Nadu Cyclone and Flood Affected Areas Cultivating Tenants Arrears of Rent (Relief) Act, 1980).

2. Varada Iyengar opposed this claim for relief on the score that Ramudu was not his cultivating tenant.

3. It appears that there were earlier proceedings between the same parties under the Tamil Nadu Act X of 1959 (Tamil Nadu Agricultural Lands (Record of Tenancy Rights) Act, 1969), concerning the inclusion of Ramudu's name in the record of tenancy rights as a cultivating tenant. The proceedings under that Act were pending before the appellate authority, while Ramudu filed his subsequent proceedings before the Revenue Court for remission of rent under Act XVII of 1980. Varada Iyengar accordingly filed an application before the Revenue Court for stay of the latter proceedings. He invoked Sections 10 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in that regard. The Revenue Court however rejected Varada Iyengar's application for stay on the store that there was no provision for stay under Act XVI of 1980 and the Revenue Court had no inherent power, either, in that regard.

4. In this revision brought by Varada Iyengar, the question is whether the Revenue Court functioning under Act XVI of 1980 has any power to grant stay of its own proceedings by reason of the fact that an earlier proceeding under Act X of 1969 was even then pending disposal on the question whether the relationship between the parties was that of landlord and cultivating tenant.

5. Before examining the point raised in this revision in detail, it may be observed that while under Act X of 1969, the Record Officer and the other authorities constituted under the Act have to decide whether a person is a tenant or a cultivating tenant for the purpose of preparing the record of tenancy rights in a village, under Act XVI of 1980 the subject-matter of inquiry before the Revenue Court is whether any arrears of rent is owed by a cultivating tenant and whether he is entitled to remission or relief from his landlord under the provisions of that Act. Having regard to the purposes of the two Acts, it might become unnecessary in proceedings under both the enactments for the appropriate authority or tribunal to consider whether there exists between the contesting parties the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant.

6. Arguing the revision for Varada Iyengar, his learned Counsel Mr. R. Sundararajan admitted that since the two proceedings between the two parties in this case, one under Act X of 1969 and the other under Act XVI of 1980 were concerned with substantially the same issue, it was eminently a fit case for stay of the proceedings under Act XVI of 1980. Otherwise, learned Counsel feared, the same issue would be the subject-matter of inquiry in a duality of proceedings under different enactments at one and the same time, which it would be the policy of the law and the lower Courts and tribunals to avoid. Learned Counsel submitted that the Revenue Court functioning under Act XVI of 1980 would have inherent jurisdiction to bring about this desirable result in the interests of avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings.

7. In my judgment, there can be no rule of law which says that an identical issue cannot be the subject-matter of different proceedings before different Tribunals. It is one thing to say that any sound system should seek to avoid multifarious proceedings. It is quite another for a Court or Tribunal to prevent parties from pursuing a remedy, which the law allows them, merely because on substantially the same issue there is another proceeding which is even then pending between the two parties in another Court or Tribunal. This must be the reason why an express provision has been enacted u