S.Jagadeesan, J.: Since the issue involved in all these appeals is one and the same and the writ petitions were disposed of by the common order by the learned single Judge, all the writ appeals are taken up for joint disposal.

2. These appeals have been filed by the State of Tamil Nadu, represented by Assistant Commissioner, Urban Land Tax, Alandur. The respondent in each of the writ appeal is owning 31 grounds and odd in Survey Nos.15/7, 15/11, 15/13 and 15/15 respectively in Injambakkam Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengleput District. They purchased the lands as agricultural lands. The appellants herein under the impugned proceedings in the writ petitions levied the Urban Land Tax, treating the entire land as urban land within the definition of Sec.2(13) of the Urban Land Tax Act.

3. Challenging the action of the appellants, the respondents filed writ petitions W.P. Nos.8756, 8757, 9136 and 9137 of 1984 contending that the lands are meant for agricultural use and they cannot be treated as ‘urban land’ as defined under the Urban Land Tax Act and hence the impugned demand is illegal.

4. The learned single Judge accepted the contention of the respondents and allowed the writ petitions and consequently set aside the impugned demand made by the appellants by judgment dated 19.4.1994 in 1994 W.L.R. 775. Aggrieved by the said order of the learned single Judge the State has preferred the present appeals.

5. The only question of the learned Government Pleader (Taxes) is that Sub-sec.(13) of Sec.2 of the said Acts defines ‘urban land’ as one which is used or capable of being used as a building site. The lands under dispute being vacant dry lands are capable of being used as house sites and as such they would fall squarely within the term ‘urban land’ as defined under the said Act. Hence, the land is attracted to tax under the said Act. The learned single Judge has proceeded on the basis that the entire land cannot be treated as lands capable of being used as house sites when they are vacant. Any land which is vacant can always be used as vacant site and the purpose of the Act cannot be with such intention. The view taken by the learned single Judge is not in consonance with the definition clause under the said Act and as such the order of the learned single Judge is liable to be set aside.

6. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondents contended that the extent of the land in each case is more than 31 grounds and as such the vast area of the land is being utilised for agricultural purposes, especially when it is admitted that casuarina trees are planted in the said land at least in a portion. There is no building in existence and hence the disputed land will not fall under the definition of ‘urban land’ as defined under the said Act and consequently will not attract the levy of tax also.

7. We carefully considered the contentions of both the counsel. Sec.2(13) of the said Act defines ‘urban land’ thus: “2(13) ‘urban land’ means any land which is used or is capable of being used as a building-site and includes garden or grounds, if any, appurtenant to a building but does not include any land which is registered as wet in the revenue accounts of the Government and used for the cultivation of wet crops. Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, any site on which any building has been constructed shall be deemed to be urban land”.

8. The scope of the said provision was considered by the then Chief Justice of this Court in Sarangapani Iyengar v. Assistant Commissioner, U.L.T., (1988)1 L.W. 152 and relying upon the said judgment the counsel for the respondents contended that any vacant land capable of being used as house site and hence the explanation to the Section is by way of guideline. If the Section is construed with the said explanation, the agricultural lands are excluded from the purview of the Act.

9. The learned counsel for the appellants also cited judgment in The Assistant Commissioner, U.L.T. v. Chelladurai, (1988)1 L

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