There can be no presumption about joint family business.

1. The petitioner was elected as the Chairman of the Vridhachalam Municipality in the year 1996. The first respondent filed a petition in O.P.No.15 of 1999 under Section 51(1) of the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act 1920 to decide about the disqualification of the petitioner, under section 50 (1)(d) of the said Act. According to the 1st respondent, who is the Councilor of the said municipality, the petitioners undivided son and his undivided brother are registered contractors of the said municipality on and from 210. 1996 on which date the petitioner was elected as Chairman. On that basis it was alleged that the petitioner has acquired an interest in the subsisting contract with the Vridhachalam municipality and so he has to be disqualified, to hold the said post under section 50(1)(d) of the said Act.

2. The said petition was contested but the petitioner alleging that he did not acquire any interest in the subsisting contract with respect to the allegation regarding his son and brother. It is the case of the petitioner that they are divided brother and divided son, and so the averments made in the said petition with respect to his disqualification cannot be sustained. the learned District Judge in the order dated 10. 99 found that Palanisami is the undivided son with whom the petitioner had common interest and the contract was subsisting during the time of office as Chairman, held by the petitioner. On the basis of the said finding the learned District Judge allowed that petition holding that he is disqualified from holding the post of Chairman if Vridhachalam municipality. Having aggrieved, the petitioner has filed the above writ petition, challenging the said order of the learned District Judge.

3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that merely because a son is undivided son, it cannot be assumed that the petitioner is having interest in the business of his son, unless it is independently established. In support of his submission, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the Division Bench decision in R. Selvaraj, v. R. Radhakrishna, AIR 1976 Mad. 156. According to him, the learned District Judge has found that the petitioner is having interest in the subsisting contract, merely because his son is the undivided son. The said approach, according to the learned Senior Counsel, cannot be sustained in law, in view of the above said decision.

4. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the 1st respondent has submitted that the learned District Judge is correct in holding that the petitioner is disqualified in view of the admitted fact that the petitioners undivided son was having with the municipality during the petitioner;s tenure of office as Chairman of the said municipality. He has also relied on the decision in Swarnam v. Sobaran Singh, AIR 1993 S.C. 212, in support of his submission.

5. In this case, there is no dispute that during the tenure of office of the petitioner as Chairman of the said Municipality, his son had the subsisting contract with the said municipality. The learned District Judge has decided the case only on the basis of the subsisting contract given to the petitioners undivided son. In view of the factual finding of the learned District Judge that the petitioners son is the undivided son, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has proceed with his argument only on that basis.

6. Now, it has to be decided whether, merely because the undecided son of the petitioner had the subsisting contract with the said municipality during the tenure of office of the petitioner as chairman of the said municipality, the petitioner is disqualified under section 49 of the said Act.

7. The learned District Judge in the order dated 10. 1999 has simply proceeded on the basis that" we have already held that as undivided members of a Hindu joint family both the first respondent (the petitioner herein) and his son Palanisamy could naturally have common