Judgment of court below being irregular set aside.

1. These two revisions arise under the following circumstances: The revision petitioner is the tenant and the respondents are the landlords. In this order hereafterwards, the parties to the two revisions will be referred to as the landlords and the tenant. The landlords filed R.C.O.P. No. 105 of 1989 seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent. The landlords also filed R.C.O.P. No. 106 of 1989 seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of additional accommodation. Both the cases are governed under the provisions of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Rent Controller ordered eviction in both the cases on merits. The tenant filed Miscellaneous Appeals Nos. 7 of 1991 and 9 of 1991 before the Appellate Authority, Pondicherry. The Appellate Authority also dismissed the appeals on merits. C.R.P. No. 806 of 1995 is directed against the order of eviction in R.C.O.P. No. 105 of 1989 and C.R.P. No. 807 of 1995 is directed against the order in R.C.O.P.No. 106 of 1989.

2. Heard Mr.AR.L. Sundaresan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the revisions and Mr.G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent in both the revisions. As far as the order of eviction granted on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent is concerned, the learned counsel for the tenant argued that the materials placed before the authorities below do not disclose any conduct on the part of the tenant from which it could be inferred that the tenant in guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent. Assuming that the tenant was in default, yet the rent for the default period having been paid even before the filing of the Rent Control Petition itself, there is no cause of action for the landlords to proceed further. For this proposition, the learned counsel for the tenant relied upon three judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court of India and the same would be referred to in the latter portion of the judgment. As far as the order of eviction on the ground of additional accommodation is concerned, the learned counsel for the tenant would primarily and in the foremost contend that the order must be set aside on the following grounds:

(a) there is no pleading by the landlords or by the tenant on relative hardship.

(b) there is no oral evidence on the side of the landlords or on the side of the tenant on the question of relative hardship; and

(c) on the question of relative hardship, there is no discussion and consequently, there is no finding at all on that issue rendered by the Authorities below.

On the grounds stated above, the eviction on the ground of additional accommodation cannot be sustained. Even otherwise, according to the learned counsel for the tenant, the materials placed on record do not make out a case to grant the relief of eviction on the ground of additional accommodation. However Mr.G. Masilamani, learned senior counsel appearing for the landlords, would contend that the materials placed before the court by the landlords clinchingly establish that the tenant is guilty of wilful default in the payment of rent. It may be true that the landlords had issued a notice dated 24. 1989 marked as Ex.A.1 in this case, to the tenant. However that notice is not a notice demanding payment of rent. Only in such an event, the notice can be construed as a notice issued under the Rent Control Act and therefore any payment stated to have been made by the tenant in response to such notice only can be taken into account to decide whether the default is wilful or not. In as much as in the case or hand Ex.A.1 does not satisfy the requirements of a notice contemplated under the Rent Control Act, any payment made by the tenant subsequent to the receipt of the notice will not absolve him of the disqualification he had already suffered on account of non payment of rent in time. Even otherwise the learned senior counsel would contend that the payment of r