Tenant may be put to hardship is no ground for rejecting bonafide requirement of landlord.

The tenant is the petitioner in this revision. The respondent is the landlord. He is the owner of the premises Door Nos.29,30,31,40-A and 40-B of Servaikaran Pudhu Street, Ward No.2, Street No.11, Shengottah. The petitioner tenant is the lessee of Door No.30 of the same building. The respondent filed the petition in R.C.O.P. No.2 of 1994 on the file of the Rent Controller, Shengottah for evicting the petitioner from the said premises on two grounds namely, wilful default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement for additional accommodation. The rent controller rejected the petition for eviction filed by the respondent herein on both the grounds and dismissed the petition on 29. 1995. As against this order, the landlord preferred R.C.A. No.8 of 1995. Before the Appellate Authority, the grounds of wilful default of payment of rent was not proved. The lower Appellate Authority accepted the case of the respondent landlord on the ground of bona fide requirement for additional accommodation and allowed the appeal. The order of the lower appellate court was passed on 211. 1996. The correctness of the order of the appellate authority ordering eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement for additional accommodation is challenged in this revision. Notice of motion was ordered on 1. 1987. Interim stay was granted in the meanwhile. The respondent, on service of notice, has now entered appearance and by ‘consent’ of both the parties, the main revision itself is taken up for final hearing. The only point that arise for consideration in this case is whether the requirement of the landlord for the portion occupied by the tenant in Door No.30 is bona fide or not and that the tenant is liable to be evicted on this ground. Before the Rent Controller, Exs. A-1 and A-2 were marked on the side of the landlord and Exs.R-1 to R-5 were marked on the side of the tenant. The landlord Jahir Hussain was examined as P.W.1 and the tenant Kuthalingam was examined as P.W.1. The report and the sketch prepared by the Advocate Commissioner was marked as Exs.C-1 and C-2.

2. Mr. Sankara Subramaniam, learned counsel for the tenant, the writ petitioner herein, contended that the finding of the appellate authority that the petition schedule premises required by the landlord by way of additional accommodation is wrong and that the appellate authority should have held that the alleged requirement by the landlord is not bona fide. It is further contended that Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act cannot be interfered by the landlord in view of the fact that the petition schedule premises is not a portion of the premises alleged to be in the occupation of the landlord. Therefore, he contends that the appellate authorities should have held that both the premises were of separate door numbers and have separate ingress and egress and therefore the landlord cannot invoke Sec.10(3)(c) of the Act. It is also contended that the appellate authority has failed to consider the hardship that will be caused to the tenants. It is also submitted that even assuming that the requirement of the portion in Door No.30 is bona fide, the same may not be adequate for the landlord either to live there or to carry on any business in the premises. In support of his contention, Mr.Sankara Subramaniam placed very strong reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court Gangaram v. Shankar Reddy, (1988)4 S.C.C. 648. Per contra, Mr.C. Selvaraj, learned counsel appearing for the landlord, while reiterating the contentions raised before the appellate authority, by reply, contended that the finding of the appellate authority is purely based on the evidence let in by the landlord and therefore, such a finding is not liable to be interfered with and that the Judgment cited by the learned counsel for the tenant reported in Gangaram v. Shankar Reddy, (1988)4 S.C.C. 648 is not at all applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case and that the same is distinguishable on facts and also on law. He also