Institution to be regarded as industry and petitioner to be regarded as workman.

The petitioner was appointed as a laboratory attendant by the respondent by an order dated 19. 1984 and the salary was fixed at consolidated sum of Rs.75 per month. The services of the petitioner were terminated by the respondent by an order dated 112. 1984 with effect from 212. 1984. The petitioner was again reinstated in service by the respondent by an order dated 21. 1985, along with four other persons. The order of reinstatement was with effect from 21. 1985, and the order also states that the services of five persons were re-instated with effect from 21. 1985. The salary of the petitioner was fixed at Rs.5 per day on all working days by an order dated 27. 1985. On 112. 1985, the services of the petitioner were terminated with effect from 312. 1985. The petitioner has challenged the order of termination dated 112. 1985 on the ground that the order is illegal and unjust and the petitioner is a workman in the respondent institution within the meaning of Sec.2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and the respondent is bound to follow the mandatory conditions precedent before terminating the service of the petitioner. The respondent erred in terminating the services of the petitioner without following the procedure prescribed under Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), and the order of termination is illegal.

2. The respondent has filed a counter-affidavit denying the allegations made in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition. The principal ground that has been raised in the counter-affidavit is that the respondent- institute is not an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and the petitioner is not entitled to notice as the termination of the services of the petitioner is not a retrenchment under Sec.2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence, the provisions under Sec.25-F of the Act does not apply to the case. The respondent also raised a ground to the effect that an alternative remedy is available to the petitioner, to raise an industrial dispute, and hence, the writ petition is not maintainable. It has been stated that the termination of the services of the petitioner had been validly made and therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief as prayed for.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent- Institute is an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act and it cannot also be said that the termination of the petitioner is not a retrenchment. Learned counsel further submitted that it is a termination within the meaning of Sec.2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the provisions of Sec.25-F were not followed before terminating the services of the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that since the termination of the-services of the petitioner was done in violation of the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, the termination is void and hence, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated with backwages.

4. Though this writ petition was posted for several dates, none appeared for the respondent.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner strongly placed reliance to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Drainage Board v. A.Rajappa, (1978)2 S.C.C. 213: A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548: I978 Lab.I.C. 467: 36 Fac.L.R. 268: (1978)1 Lab. L.J. 349: 52 F.J.R. 197: (1978)1 Lab.L.N. 376: (1978)1 S.C.J. 481 and contended that the respondent- Institute is an industry. The Supreme Court in the abovesaid case has approved the views of Issacs J., in The Federated State School Teachers’ Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria and others, (1920)41 C.L.R. 569. The Supreme Court held that an educational institution has to be treated as an industry within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Supreme Court further held that if the triple tests of systematic activity, co-operation between the employer and employee and production of