Common Order:

Writ Petition Nos.20933 & 23606 of 2006 have been filed against the order of the Labour Court/first respondent made in I.A.No.117/2006 in I.D.No.514/2001 dated 16. 2006 and the other four writ petitions were filed against the order in I.A.Nos. 68 to 71 of 2005 in C.P.Nos.209 of 2004, 214 of 2004, 455 of 2004 and 456 of 2004 respectively to quash the identical order dated 03. 2006 and also to declare Section 36

(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, I.D. Act] as ultravires of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.

2. It is seen from the records that the second respondent workman engaged an authorised representative to defend him in I.D.No.514/2001, relating to his nonemployment. The writ petitioners were represented by a counsel and they filed Vakalat as early as on 23. 2002. After 55 adjournments of the case, the workman filed an application in I.A.No.117/2006 objecting to the writ petitioner/management being represented by a legal practitioner, taking advantage of section 36(4) of the I.D.Act. This was resisted by a counter affidavit filed by the writ petitioner/management stating that the fact relating to the objection has been raised after five years and after the pleadings were completed and when the witnesses were about to be cross-examined and it was also stated that once the workman did not object to the appearance of the legal practitioner on the side of the management, that would amount to implied consent and the workmen has sprung a surprise after five years and has taken a point that he is not granting consent for appearance of the legal practitioner.

3. The Labour Court technically approached the subject and sustained the objection raised by the workman by its order dated 16. 2006 solely on the ground that the workman did not give consent. The Labour Court seems to have relied on a catena of decisions of various Courts on the question of consent. Even though the restriction under section 36(4) has been upheld by the Supreme Court, in the present case, we are only concerned with the application of the said provision in a given situation. When once the workman gives up his right to object to the appearance of the counsel at the earliest stage and allowed the proceedings to go on merrily for a period of five years spanning over 55 adjournments as in the present case, there is no reason as to why such an issue should be allowed to be raised at the tail end of the proceedings. A speedy trial is a must in any proceedings and the workmen has put spokes on the proceedings by raising frivolous objection at the tail end of the trial. Such an objection can never be allowed and nowhere, Section 36 of the I.D. Act talks about any written consent of a party to be obtained in the matter of another party engaging a legal practitioner. In a given situation, the hyper technical approach of the labour Court should be avoided. Ultimately, the very creation of the Industrial adjudication is for an early disposal of the claims of the workman. But in the present case, unfortunately, the matter relating to non-employment of the workman is pending for more than five years at the hands of the Labour Court.

4. Without concerning about the same, learned counsel for the workman states that the objection relating to the consent for appearance can be raised at any time and he also relied upon the decisions which were also cited before the Labour Court. There is not a single decision of this court has been cited holding the view that the objection relating to the consent could be raised at any stage of the proceedings. On the contrary, it must be held that if the workman wants to exercise his right under section 36 of the I.D. Act so as to prevent the employer from engaging a lawyer, he should raise his objection at the earliest point of time. In any event, this objection seems to be very trivial considering the fact that often the workmen are represented by a leader of a trade union who