The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of mind by the Government in making the reference under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act and the determination of the appellant as a proper and necessary party to the reference.

Elipe Dharmarao, J.

By an agreement dated 30.10.1992, the Deccan Sugars Undertaking at Pugalur was transferred from Nava Bharat Ferro Alloys Limited (third respondent herein) to EID Parry (India) Limited (the appellant herein), which caused non-employment of 651 workmen. As against such transfer, the workers undertook protests, which turned violent. Then, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal by the Government by their G.O.(D) Nos.318, dated 30.4.1993, considering the fact that there exists an industrial dispute to be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal. Aggrieved, the appellant herein has filed W.P.No.11407 of 1993 while the Management of third respondent has filed W.P.No.12539 of 1993, both praying to issue a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records of the Government in G.O.(D) No.318, dated 30.4.1993 and quash the same. The appellant Management has also filed W.P.No.11408 of 1993, praying to issue a Writ of Prohibition, prohibiting the Industrial Tribunal from proceeding to adjudicate the dispute referred to it by the Government in G.O.(D) No.318, dated 30.4.1993. The reference was challenged by the appellant and the third respondent Managements on the grounds that since the workmen were paid compensation, they cannot challenge the agreement and no such industrial dispute arose and that even regarding the said reference, a judicial review would lie.

2. The learned single Judge, considering all the facts and circumstances of the cases and holding that there exists an industrial dispute, which should be adjudicated by the industrial tribunal, as has been referred by the Government, has dismissed the writ petitions filed by both the Managements. Both the Managements have preferred Writ Appeals, wherein the Division Bench, held that there is no dispute that the referring power of the Government, though an administrative one in nature, is amenable to judicial review. The Division Bench, after perusing the files produced by the learned Additional Advocate General, had found that the Government had sufficient materials before taking a decision under Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act Act and the only requirement of Section 10(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act is formation of an opinion based on factual existence of industrial dispute or apprehended dispute which is abundantly available though the adequacy of which cannot be gone into under Article 226 of the constitution of India and that the Government had applied their mind and arrived at a conclusion that an Industrial dispute exists and after perusal of the G.O. file it is clear that no extraneous considerations were taken note of as claimed by the Management. With such observations, the Division Bench has dismissed all the writ appeals by its common judgment dated 1. 2006.

3. Aggrieved against the said common judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in W.A.Nos.977 and 978 of 1999, the appellant herein has preferred SLP (Civil) No.3840 of 2006 before the Honourable Supreme Court and Their Lordships of the Honourable Supreme Court, by the order dated 9. 2006, have disposed of the said SLP. The Order of the Honourable Supreme Court dated 9. 2006, as amended by the order dated 19. 2006, reads as follows:

"Having heard Dr.Rajiv Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Mr.R.Venkataramani, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Tamil Nadu, we are of the opinion that interest of justice would be subserved if the Division Bench of the High Court is requested to give an opportunity to the parties as the records were produced by the State after the judgment was reserved. The petitioner to file its response in relation to the records of these proceedings on the basis whereof a reference has been made by a notification dated 30.4.1993 in terms of Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Keeping in view the fact that the parties have filed their respective written submissi