The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and applicability of the Standing Order 30, specifically clause (xxvii), in determining misconduct and supporting the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority to initiate departmental proceedings.

S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J.

In all these cases, as common judgment is under challenge, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The appellants, who were the writ petitioners (hereinafter referred to as "the petitioners"), are working as Helpers in the respondent-Electricity Board. They were suspended and proceeded departmentally by the charge memo dated 1st July, 2005.

The learned single Judge having dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the petitioners against the initiation of departmental proceedings by the charge memo dated 1st July, 2005, the present appeals have been preferred. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petitions on two counts, (i) that this court normally should not go into the merits of the contentions raised by the employees against disciplinary authority at the stage of the charge memo and (ii) in view of the liberty given by the Division Bench against the charged employees, it was open to the disciplinary authority to initiate departmental proceedings.

3. The petitioners have challenged the charge memo mainly on the following grounds:-

(i) The allegations made in the charge memo do not constitute a misconduct under the Certified Standing Orders.

(ii) The first charge relates to the enrollment in a cooperative society, which cannot be decided by the disciplinary authority of the Electricity Board.

4. For deciding the issue, it is necessary to notice the relevant fact as stated hereunder:

An industrial cooperative society, by name, The Tuticorin Thermal Power Station Industrial Cooperative Service Society Limited (for short, "INDCOSERVE") was functioning in the Tuticorin Thermal Power Station under the second respondent-Chief Engineer, Tuticorin Thermal Power Station, Tuticorin. The said society was organised with a view to streamline the engagement of contract labour and the entire infrastructure including the management of the society ws entrusted to the officers of the second respondent. Wages were directly paid by the Electricity Board. Subsequently, on the abolition of contract labour system in Thermal Power Station due to the policy decision taken by the Government, there was no requirement for the society and it was proposed to take 450 persons, who were enrolled by the society, as workers of the Electricity Board. Since the employment was indirectly guaranteed if they were employed by INDCOSERVE society, it was alleged that certain bogus enrollment was done with the connivance of the officials of the Board. This came to the notice of the Board through a vigilance enquiry and it was found that eight persons were enrolled as members only with a view to secure employment in the Board, though originally they were never enrolled. One P.K.Arumugam, who was the then Chief Engineer of the Thermal Power Station, was found responsible for the same and the vigilance enquiry noted that eight persons including the present five petitioners have been made as members at the instance of the then Chief Engineer, who wanted to accommodate the children of the existing employees of the Electricity Board and enrolled them as members without authority. Therefore, a direction was given to take action. It appears that the Special Officer of INDCOSERVE society, by the General Body Meeting dated 12th May, 1996, decided to remove the eight members, who were fraudulently enrolled and a resolution to that effect was passed. This was informed to the vigilance department. In the light of the same, the petitioners were disengaged from service after a show cause notice. It was at that stage the petitioners preferred writ petitions in W.P.Nos.18075 to 18080 of 2000 before this Court and this Court, by a common order dated 22nd February, 2001, dismissed the writ petitions by stating that the petitioners, being workmen within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are bound to raise an industrial dispute since disputed questions of fact have been pleaded and only an industrial adju