The judgment establishes the principle that property rights, eviction, and public interest must be considered within the legal framework of lease agreements, subleases, and the authority of public entities to take possession for restoration purposes.

Heard both sides.

2. The petitioners, who are claiming to have their shops inside the Victoria Public Hall compound (for short VP Hall) and were claiming to pay licence fees to the VP Hall Trust Board, have challenged two notices issued by the Corporation of Chennai. The first notice was issued by the Corporation, dated 8. 2009. The said notice directed the occupants/licensees to vacate their respective premises within seven days and hand over vacant possession to the Corporation, failing which appropriate legal action will be taken against them.

3. The reason given by the respondent Corporation in the impugned notice was that the Victoria Public Hall Trust Board on 13. 2009 passed a resolution to hand over to the Corporation its movable and immovable properties. The petitioners without any valid lease or licence are running their shops in the place leased out to the Victora Public Hall. In view of the resolution, there was no right for the petitioners to carry on their business there. It was also stated that the Victoria Public Hall Trust Board itself was a lessee under the Corporation of Chennai. They have no right either to lease or rent out the premises under the terms of the lease. It was also stated that the VP Hall was almost 120 years old and it was in a damaged and dilapidated condition. The Corporation of Chennai had decided to restore the building to its old glory as an heritage building. In view of public interest, the Corporation wanted to repair and restore the building.

4. The petitioners challenging the said notice have moved this Court. A status quo order was granted on 18. 2009, which was continued subsequently by frequent extensions. The first respondent had filed counter affidavits, dated 28. 2009.

5. The history of forming the V.P.Trust Board was briefly as follows:- It is seen from the records that in a public meeting of the inhabitants of Madras, on invitation of the Sheriff of Madras, on 13. 1882, it was resolved to erect a Town Hall to be vested in the Trustees for the use and benefit of the public. Subsequently, the Corporation allotted an area in the Peoples Park abutting the Poonamallee Road to an extent of 57 grounds with 99 years of lease at a rent of eight annas per ground per annum. It was renewable at the end of each term of 99 years for a like period. Subsequently, the Town Hall was constructed in the said site, which was named as VP Hall. It was decided to let the property for promotion of welfare and recreation of the inhabitants as the trustees may decide and dispose of the rents.

6. Subsequently, the Advocate General of Madras had filed a scheme suit before this court in its original side being C.S.No.263 of 1921. Accordingly, by a judgment and decree, dated 27.09.1921, a scheme was framed by this Court. Thereafter, when attempts were made to hand over the VP Hall to the Corporation of Chennai, that was also challenged before this Court. A compromise decree was arrived at between the trustees in CS.No.98 of 1957, by an order, dated 15.09.1961. In that compromise decree apart from reconstituting the Board of Trustees, a clause provided the trustees to sublet, mortgage build upon, pull down, rebuild and alter buildings upon or otherwise deal with the said piece or parcel of land forming the said site of the Town Hall. Therefore, the petitioners claimed that by virtue of that clause, they were entitled to enter into licence or lease agreements with the VP Hall Trust Board. It was thus, they came into possession of the premises and they have located their shops. The superstructures were put up by them. The petitioners also claim that inasmuch as the trustee were entitled to hold the land on a lease for 99 years, which was renewable, their continuance in the premises with the permission of the trust was also valid.

7. It was also stated that the rents payable to the second respondent have been paid upto 33. 2009. Thereafter, the rents were not received by the second respondent for