2005 Supreme(Mad) 401
High Court of Judicature at Madras
THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. MARKANDEY KATJU & THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. MURUGESAN
Dr.K. Nedunchezhian
Versus
The Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax & Another
W.A. Nos. 453 and 454 of 2005
Decided on: 03-03-2005
Q
For The Appellant:G.Rajagopalan, Senior counsel, M/s.G.R.Associates. For The Respondents:Ravikumar, Advocate.
After exhausting alternative remedy of appeal, writ petition should be filed.
Headnote:Constitution of India-Article 226-Writ petition-Alternative remedy of appeal provided in the Income Tax Act-No short circuiting in statutory remedy is sustainable.
Markandey Katju, CJ.
These are two connected writ appeals and are being disposed off by a common judgment. Heard the learned senior counsel for the appellant and the learned departmental counsel.
2. The appellant had first filed a writ petition challenging the assessment notice under section 158BC of the Income-tax Act, 1961. That writ petition being W.P. No.38648 of 2004 was dismissed on 7.2.2005 on the ground that assessment order has already been passed on 29.12.2004 and the writ petition challenging that assessment order being W.P.No.1725 of 2005 has also been dismissed on 27.1.2005.
3. W.P.No.1725 of 2005 had been dismissed by the learned single Judge on the ground that since the assessment order has been passed the petitioner has an alternative remedy of filing an appeal under section 246 read with section 251 of the Income-tax Act. We agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge that the appellant has an efficacious alternative remedy of filing an appeal.
4. In W.A. No.377 of 2005 dated 2.3.2005 (M/s.Nivaram Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. The Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, Madras) we have discussed this matter in great detail and have observed that particularly in tax matters there should be no short circuiting of the alternative statutory remedies as has been repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court.
5. It is well settled by a series of decisions of the Supreme Court that particularly in tax matters there should be no short circuiting of the statutory remedies, vide Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar V. Dunlop India Limited, AIR 1985 SC 330, etc.
6. It is well settled that when there is an alternative remedy ordinarily writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be invoked. This principle applies with greater force regarding tax proceedings. As observed by the Supreme Court in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603:
7. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in G.Veerappa Pillai V. Raman and Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192 held that as the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained code and itself provides for a forum for appeal/revision, the writ jurisdiction should not be invoked in matters relating to its provisions. A similar view was taken in Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar V. Dunlop India Limited, AIR, 1985 SC 330.
8. In Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Chandan Nagar V. Dunlop India Limited (supra) the Supreme Court observed:
"In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. V. State of Orissa, AIR 1983 SC 603 A.P.Sen, E.S.Venkataramiah and R.B.Misra, JJ. held that where the statute itself provided the petitioners with an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal to the Prescribed Authority, a second appeal to the Tribunal and thereafter to have the case stated to the High Court, it was not for the High Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution ignoring as it were, the complete statutory machinery. That it has become necessary, even now, for us to repeat this admonition is indeed a matter of tragic concern to us. Article 226 is not meant to short circuit or circumvent statutory procedures. It is only where statutory remedies are entirely ill suited to meet the demands of extraordinary situations, as for instance where the very vires of the statute is in question or where private or public wrongs are so inextricably mixed up and the prevention of public injury and the vindication of public justice require it that recourse may be had to Art.226 of the Constitution. But, then the Court must have good and sufficient reason to by pass the alternative remedy provided by statute. Surely, matters involving the revenue where statutory remedies are available are not such matters. We can also take judicial notice of the fact that the vast majority of the petitions under Art.226 of the Co