The main legal point established is that in the absence of a compromise decree, the court has the discretion to extend the time for payment under Section 148 of C.P.C. based on the circumstances pleaded by the judgment debtor.

1. The Judgment Debtor-1 in O.S.No.121 of 1991 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Villupuram is the revision petitioner. She filed the above revision against the dismissal of her application filed under Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure (In short "C.P.C."). The petition filed under Order 21, Rule 90, came up for hearing before the Court below on 23.8.2001 and she made an endorsement to the effect that she agrees to deposit the amount due under the auction before 24.9.2001, failing which her application may be dismissed. Since she could not deposit the amount before 24.9.2001, she filed an application on 25.9.2001, for extension of time under Section 148 of C.P.C. and also a petition under Order 34 Rule 5 of C.P.C. for deposit of the amount. The learned Subordinate Judge, after dismissing her application filed under Order 21 Rule 90 of C.P.C. rejected the said application on 28.9.2001, hence, the present revision.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the second respondent.

3. The petitioner herein who is a Judgment Debtor No.1 has filed a petition under Order 21 Rule 90 of C.P.C. to set aside the sale. In that petition she made an endorsement on 23.8.2001, praying for one month time for paying the entire amount. As per the said endorsement, the petitioner/ Judgment Debtor No.1 agreed to pay the entire decree amount on or before 24.9.2001, failing which the application can be dismissed without further enquiry. Though she could not pay the entire amount before 24.9.2001, she filed the present application on 25.9.2001 i.e., next day under Section 148 of C.P.C. praying for an order to extend the time in E.A.No.477 of 1999 by one day. Among the respondents, the auction purchaser-the respondent therein opposed the said application on the ground that she filed the application on 25.9.2001, that is after expiry of the last date, namely 24.9.2001, the Court has no power to consider the same. The said objection was accepted by the learned Subordinate Judge and dismissed the application of the Judgment Debtor No.1, even without numbering the same.

4. In order to appreciate the question raised, it is useful to refer Section 148 of C.P.C., which reads as under.

" 148. Enlargement of time. - Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. "

Here, in our case, the learned counsel appearing for second respondent vehemently contended that in view of the fact that the petitioner herself agreed to pay the amount before 24.9.2001 and based on her endorsement and in the light her default in non-complying with the same within the time prescribed, the Court below is justified in dismissing her petition even without numbering the same. After going through Section 148 of C.P.C., I am unable to appreciate his contention. Here, it is to be noted that on the next day she filed a petition along with the required amount for extension of one day and the reason for non-compliance is that she could not arrange for funds which exceeded Rs. 1,90,000.00.

5. Now, I shall consider various decisions referred to by either side. Mrs. Krishnaveni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has very much relied on the decision of Sathiadev, J., in the case of G. Rangaraju v. Meenakshi Ammal, A.I.R. 1984 Madras 147 . In that case, the learned Judge has held that even in the case of compromise decree the Executing Court could in a proper case and to further the ends of justice extend under Section 148 C.P.C. the time for payment fixed in the decree. The learned Judge further held that the contract between the parties get merged in the order of the Court by passing a compromise decree and the Court thereafter had the freedom to act to further the ends of justice, such freedom could not be curtailed by pleading t