The judgment of a court may be considered biased and a nullity if there is a real danger of bias on the part of the presiding officer, and in such cases, the matter may be remanded for de novo consideration.

1. The plaintiff, who is the unsuccessful before the two courts below is the appellant in this second appeal. Heard Ms. Chitra Sampath, for Mr. T.R. Rajaraman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. N.V. Venkataseshan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

2. In the nature of disposal which this Court, in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction proposes to pass, it is not necessary to set out the details of pleadings relating to the case and counter case of the parties. For convenience, the parties will be referred as arrayed before the trial court.

3. The plaintiff instituted the suit in O.S.No.90 of 1981 on the file of sub court, Tenkasi, seeking the relief of specific performance against the defendants. Concedingly there is no written agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant, who is the owner. The plaintiff had based her claim based upon the correspondence exchanged between the plaintiff and the first defendant as well as her claim that she had paid substantial amount of Rs.19,000 out of Rs.24,500 towards the sale consideration and that she is entitled for specific performance. Per contra, the contesting first defendant, the owner, had denied such an agreement and pleaded that she had neither agreed to sell the suit property to the plaintiff and that the payment, if any, made by the plaintiff is towards the income from her estate to which the plaintiff had been entrusted as her agent and not as part of sale consideration.

4. Thetrial court framed as many a nine issues. The plaintiff marked Exs.A-1 to A-21 and examined herself as P.W.1, while the defendants marked Exs.B-1 and B-2. The first defendant examined herself as D.W.1. The trial court, after consideration of oral and documentary evidence recorded a finding against the plaintiff in respect of all the issues and dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff had not established the alleged agreement of sale and that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim specific performance.

5. Being aggrieved, the plaintiff preferred A.S.No.40 of 1988 on the file of the Ist Additional District Court, Tirunelveli. The first appellate court, after framing seven points for consideration, ultimately by its judgment and decree dated 9.8.89 confirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the first appellate court dated 9.8.89, the present second appeal has been preferred.

6. At the time of admission, the following three substantial questions of law were framed by this Court:-

"(1) Whether the learned District Judge was right in dismissing the suit when D.W.1 had clearly admitted the agreement to sell as found in Ex.A-1 on the ground that the plaintiff had not proved the existence of the agreement?

(2) Whether the learned District Judge grossly erred in holding that the defendant was only a sharer inspite of the clear recitals in Ex.A.21 about her absolute rights to the suit property?

(3) Whether the learned District Judge was correct in dismissing I.A.No.7 of 1988 filed under Order 41, Rule 27, C.P.C.?

7. Apart from the above substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission, Ms.Chitra Sampath, learned counsel for the appellant raised a substantial question which goes to the root of the first appellate court judgment and according to the learned counsel, the judgment of the first appellate court being biased is a nullity and, therefore, the matter has to be remitted back at the first appellate court for de novo consideration. The learned counsel raised the additional question of law and argued the following substantial question of law at the hearing:-

" Whether the lower appellate court is biased? Whether the judgment of the first appellate court is vitiated by bias and is a nullity? Whether the ground of bias is made out? Whether the appeal has to be remitted be set aside and the matter has to be remitted back to the first appellate court?

8. Per contra, Mr.Venkataseshan, l