The main legal point established is that the court has the discretion to set aside an exparte order upon payment of costs and upon showing good and sufficient cause, and that the lower court's order imposing an onerous condition was in excess of its jurisdiction.

1. The civil revision petition is against an order passed in I.A.No.4318 of 2000 in O.S.No.4002 of 1999 on the file of the III Assistant Judge, under Order 9, Rule 7, CPC.

2. The petitioner is the defendant against whom an exparte order was passed on 10.3.2000 in the suit filed by the respondent for recovery of a sum of Rs. 1,81,600 with interest. So the petitioner filed the above interlocutory application to set-aside the exparte order. This was allowed by the learned Judge on condition the petitioner deposits the suit claim within a month from the date of the order and paid the cost of Rs.200, failing which the petition would stand dismissed. Aggrieved by this the present civil revision petition has been filed.

3. Mr. N.L. Rajah, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the said order imposed a very onerous condition which was not warranted in the circumstances, and it resulted out of a highly irregular exercise of jurisdiction. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner on 13.2.2000 and 29.2.2000 which were the dates fixed for appearance of the parties both parties did not appear because there was a boycott of Courts by the advocates. The matter was therefore posted on 10.3.2000. But the date had been wrongly noted as 13.3.2000. Only on 13.3.2000 the A-diary was checked. It was known that the matter was already been held on 10.3.2000 and the petitioner was set exparte. So this interlocutory application was filed on 15.3.2000 to set aside the exparte order. The learned Counsel for the petitioner compared the provisions of Order 9, Rule 7 and Order 9, Rule 13 and submitted that vide under Order 9, Rule 7 if the defendant appears and assigns costs for previous non-appearance, the Court can set-aside the order upon payment of costs or otherwise. Whereas under Order 9, Rule 13 the Court has also the discretion to order payment. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel there was no justification for such an onerous condition to be imposed on the petitioner to have the exparte order set aside especially when there is nothing to show that the petitioner has been protracting the matter unnecessarily. He relied on Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others, AIR 1964 SC 993, Surendra Mohapatra v. Annapurna Mohapatra, AIR 1969 Ori. 251, Perumal Naicker v. Kondama Naicker, AIR 1939 Mad. 385, Radhamoni Padhiari v. Tangudu Jaganatham, AIR 1978 Ori. 209 Smt. Manoramabai Xetie v. Smt.Lidia Belinda Simoes, AIR 1975 Goa 7, Bank of Baroda v. Sansar Chand Kapur and another, AIR 1994 Del. 359 and Delhi Development Authority v. Shanti Devi and another, AIR 1982 Del. 159, to support his case, that even after an exparte decree has been passed the defendant can participate in the remaining proceedings. That being the case the order of the learned Judge would virtually amount to decreeing the suit. He also submitted that from the decisions cited by him/it is seen that if good and sufficient cause is shown then the exparte order would be set aside.

4. In reply the learned Counsel Mr. A. Venugopal, who is also the party respondent vehemently argued that discretionary orders of the lower Court should not be interfered with any revision and cited Terene Traders v. Ramesh Chandra Jamnadas & Co. and another, AIR 1987 SC 1492, Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh and others, AIR 1989 SC 2073, Ganga Prasad and others v. Ram Saran and others, AIR 1978 All. 43, The Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Suresh Chadra Jaipuria and another, AIR 1976 SC 2621 and Raj Kumar Soni v. Mohan Meakin Breweries Ltd., AIR 1970 All. 370, in support of his contentions. He also said that the petitioner had no intention of returning the money and all that she wanted to do is to delay the payment as far as possible. So he strongly urged that the deposit of the suit claimed was perfectly in order. He also pointed out that it was not as if the learned Judge directed the petitioner to pay to the respondent the entire suit claim. The interest of the petitioner w