Venkatarama Ayyar, J.-

This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the decision of this Court in Appeal No. 698 of 1948. That appeal arose out of a suit for partition instituted by the respondent in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Narsapur. The present petitioner was the 1st defendant in the suit. His wife was the 2nd defendant. The plaintiff alleged that he had been taken in adoption by the defendants on 7th April, 1932 and that as adopted son he was entitled to a half share in the family properties. On 6th July, 1940 the 1st defendant had sold some of the suit properties to the 2nd defendant under Exhibit D-7 and settled other properties on her on 25th October 1944 under Exhibit D-10. The plaintiff contended that these deeds were not binding on him and that he was entitled to a half share in the properties comprised in those deeds. The defendants contested the suit on several grounds. They denied that they took the plaintiff in adoption. They contended that the deeds Exhibit D-7 and D-10 were valid and binding on him. They also pleaded that the suit was barred by limitation. They raised several other pleas. On these pleadings, as many as 25 issues were framed. Of these, issuses 1 to 3 are alone now material. They are as follows:

“1. Whether the suit is barred by limitation because it is filed more than 3 years after plaintiff attained majority?

2. Whether defendants 1 and 2 adopted plaintiff on 7th April, 1932, as alleged?

3. Whether the claim of plaintiff, if true, is defeated by exclusion for 12 years or adverse possession of 1st defendant?”

At the hearing of the suit, these issues were tried as preliminary issues. The Subordinatejudge held in favour of the plaintiff on issues 1 and 3 on the question of limitation. But he held on the 2nd issue that the plaintiff had not proved the ad6ption set up by him. On that he dismissed the suit. The plaintiff preferred an appeal against that decision to this Court, Appeal No. 698 of 1948, and in our judgment dated 12th November, 1952, we held, differing from the Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff had established his adoption. Agreeing with the Subordinate Judge on the question of limitation we remanded the case for trial of the other issues. The 1st defendant has filed the present application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against this order. The point for decision is whether the order of remand dated 12th November, 1952, is a final order within the meaning of Article 133 of the Constitution.

It is contended by Mr. P.M. Srinivasa Aiyangar, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, that as we have decided on issue 2 that the plaintiff was adopted by defendants 1 and 2, our judgment would be a final order, because on that finding the plaintiff would be entitled to a half share in the family properties. But the truth of the adoption was not the only question in controversy between the parties. If that had been so on our finding on issue 2, we should have passed a preliminary decree for partition, and that would have been open to appeal as a decree under Article 133. There are other and substantial questions on which the parties are at issue. For example, the plaintiff contends that the sale deed, Exhibit D-7 dated 6th July, 1940 and the settlement deed Exhibit D-10 dated 27th October, 1944, are not binding on him. The defendants, however, plead that they are valid and binding on him. Issues 4, 5 and 6 relate to this contention. Unless these issues are determinated, there cannot be a final adjudication of the points in dispute in the suit. No doubt thee issue as to adoption is an important one, and by reason of our finding on that issue, one obstacle to the plaintiff obtaining a decree is removed. But before he can obtain a preliminary decree for partition, other issues also must be determined. Therefore, our judgment is interlocutory in character, not final.

There is considerable and high authority interpreting the precise meaning of the words "fina

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