Govinda Menon, J.- At the very outset of his arguments the learned Advocate-General raised the objection that this Court has no power to issue a writ of certiorari claimed by the petitioners, and he rested his argument on an interpretation of Article 225 and 226 of the Constitution of India. The decision of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Ryots of Garbandho v. Zamindar of Parlakimidi1 , which lays down that the High Court at Madras has no power to issue a writ of certiorari on an officer or official body beyond the limits of the Presidency Town of Madras except in a limited manner as regards British subjects and that the Madras Supreme Court Charter (1800), clause 8, did not confer such a power has been relied upon by the learned Advocate-General. This decision must be deemed to have overruled the earlier decisions of this Court, such as In re Nataraja Iyer 2, and the cases which followed the same, to the effect that the High Court has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari on an officer beyond the limits of its Ordinary original jurisdiction. It has been understood both by the Bench and the Bar in this Court prior to the decision in Parlakimidi’s case1, that this Court has inherited all the powers of its predecessor, viz., the Supreme Court of Madras, in the matter of issuing all the prerogative writs which the Court of King’s Bench in England had and which were conferred upon the Supreme Court by its Charter of 1800. There had been a number of instances where writs of certiorari had been issued to tribunals, authorities and officers functioning outside the City of Madras and even a writ of prohibition had been issued by this Court on a Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies functioning outside the city as in Krishna Iyer v. The Secretary, Urban Bank, Ltd., Calicut3 But the authoritative pronouncement of Viscount Simon in the Parlakimidi’s case1, referred to above has reversed the current of decisions prior to it and if the Constitution of India did not confer a right on this Court to issue a writ within the limits of its appellate jurisdiction, then we have to hold that our power is limited to issuing writs within the limits of the Presidency town of Madras. The learned Advocate-General invited our attention to Article 32, clauses (2) and (3), especially to clause (3) which says that Parliament may by law empower any Court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). Clause (2) empowered the Supreme Court to issue the prerogative writs such as habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari and other directions or orders for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III on the citizen. Article 139 enacts that the Parliament may, by law, confer on the Supreme Court power to issue directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, for purposes other than those mentioned in clause (2) of Article 32. It is therefore clear that the Supreme Court, as a Court of original jurisdiction, has not been empowered to issue writs in the first instance for any purposes other than the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution. In other words, it is not open to any party to approach the Supreme Court, and pray for the issue of a writ or order on any tribunal, authority or officer, doing judicial or quasi-judicial functions, if such authority, tribunal, or officer was acting in excess of his jurisdiction or refusing to act in the proper exercise of his jurisdiction except for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The question for consideration is whether Article 226 has conferred that power on the High Court with regard to the enforcement of rights conferred by Part III. But the learned Advocate-General invites our attention to Article 225 of the Constitution whereby the jurisdict

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