1. These two revision petitions were filed against the orders of the Rent Control Appellate Authority refusing to implead the revision petitioner as petitioner in the Rent Control Original Petition filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein.

2. Respondents 1 and 2 filed the Rent Control proceedings for eviction of respondents 3 and 4 on the ground of wilful default and submitted that during the pendency of the proceedings, they have sold the property to the revision petitioner and therefore, the application was filed by respondents 1 and 2 to implead the revision petitioner as third party to the proceedings and that was allowed by the Rent Controller and reversed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority and hence, the proposed party has filed the revision petitions.

3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the revision petitioner has purchased the property and is entitled to prosecute the case filed by respondents 1 and 2 and this court also held in the decision in RENGANATHAN v. PANDURANGAN AND ANOTHER (1995-2-LW 160) that the subsequent purchaser can be impleaded to prosecute the petition filed by the original landlords and without considering the same, the Rent Control Appellate authority dismissed the application.

4. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 submitted that the purchaser cannot continue the proceedings initiated by the original landlords and the cause of action will not survive to the purchaser and after the purchase, tenancy was attorned to the revision petitioner and the respondent has been paying rent regularly and the wilful default was only in respect of non-payment of rent towards original landlords, who was the owner of the building and therefore, there is no wilful default as against the purchaser, the revision petitioner and hence, the petition cannot be prosecuted by the revision petitioner on the same cause of action.

5. The learned Rent Control Appellate authority held that the revision petitioner will not come under the definition of landlord on the date of alleged default committed by the tenant and during the alleged period of wilful default, the revision petitioner was not the owner of the property and there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the revision petitioner and respondents 3 and 4 and therefore, the revision petitioner cannot be permitted to prosecute the case filed by the landlords. The Rent Control Appellate authority also held that if the main R.C.O.P is filed for some other grounds, then the position will be different and so far as the ground of wilful default is concerned, the same cannot be continued by the revision petitioner.

6. The learned Rent Control Appellate authority failed to note that the application for eviction was filed on the ground of wilful default and on the ground of subletting. Even according to the learned Rent Control Appellate authority, a petition for eviction on the ground of wilful default cannot be prosecuted by the subsequent purchaser. The Rent Control Appellate authority failed to note that the petition was filed on the ground of subletting also. Further, as per the judgment reported in 1995-2-LW 160, the subsequent purchaser is entitled to implead himself in the original petition and as a matter of fact, in that judgment, the subsequent purchaser was permitted to file application to restore the petition filed by the landlord which was dismissed for default. Therefore, as per the judgment in 1995-2-LW 160, the subsequent purchaser is entitled to continue the proceedings initiated by the original landlord.

7. Further, the Rent Control Act enables the landlord to apply for eviction on the grounds stated in section 10 and section 14(1)(a) and (b). Under section 10(3) and 14 (1)(a) and (b), eviction can be sought for the personal requirement of the landlord or for the demolition of the building for the purpose of putting up new construction. Insofar as the grounds of eviction enum