The main legal point established in the judgment is the application and interpretation of the Married Womens Property Act in the context of a life assurance policy dispute.

Cornish, J.

1. The appellant in A.S. No. 50 is the Bengal Insurance and Real Property Company, having its head office in Calcutta. It was sued by the plaintiff, the widow of Sengottiah Goundan, to recover the money due on a life assurance policy between her husband and the company. The proposal for this policy was made through, the companys agent at Erode on August 21, 1927. The proposal was accepted by the company on September 8, 1927. Thereupon a half years premium became payable within 5 days from the date of the companys notice of acceptance of the proposal. But this premium not having been paid a fresh certificate of health, as required by the companys notice (Ex. XXIII) had to be furnished by the assured to the company. This he did on January 22, 1928, and the declaration or certificate is Ex. I. It stated that he was at the time in good health, and that since his medical examination on August 30,1927, he had not consulted any medical man or suffered from any illness. The policy was issued on May 5, 1928. In a little over 3 months namely, on August 16, 1928, the assured died of pernicious anaemia.

2. The plaintiffs claim to recover the money was resisted by the company on two principal grounds (1). the written statement alleged that the policy was made void by the fraudulent suppression of a material fact by the assured, viz., his disease, of which he must have been aware at the time when he made his declaration of good health on January 22, 1928; and (2) that the trial Court of Coimbatore had no jurisdiction over the suit as no part of the cause of action had arisen within the limits of that Courts jurisdiction.

3. There is no evidence that the assured was ill when he made the declaration or that he was suffering then from the ailment which was so soon to be fatal to him. The doctor who examined him in August 1927 certified the assured as a first class life for insurance. This witness says that he had never seen a case of pernicious anaemia, but he has read about this ailment and he stated that he saw none of it s symptoms in the assured when he examined him. The widow of the assured (P. W. No. 2) says that her husband was in good health until about 1-|- months before his death. He was then advised to go to Bangalore for a change, and he died in Bangalore. The doctor who attended him there has not given evidence. He gave the certificate that assured was under his treatment for pernicious anaemia and that he died of this disease. This information is expended in a later letter to the effect that the assured was under his treatment from July 29, till his death. But there is no evidence when this ailment seized the assured. Reference has been made to standard medical books, from which it appears that pernicious anaemia in an insidious complaint which may run its course repaidly within a period of 6 to 12 weeks. Upon this state of the facts it is impossible to hold that the defendant company had succeeded in showing either that the assured knew that he had this disease or, indeed, that he had it in January 1928, when he signed the declaration of his good health, or even in April when he paid the premium.

4. The learned Advocate for the appellant briefly referred to the question whether the plaintiffs suit might not be barred by

5. Article 85 of the Limitation Act, the suit having been brought more than 3 years after the proof of the death of the assured. But he very fairly conceded that it was difficult to maintain this position in the face of Ex. XII. This document is a clear admission by the company of the claim and is sufficient to save the bar of time. We are of opinion that the suit is not time-barred.

6. The main argument turned on the question of jurisdiction. The lower Court held that a part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction inasmuch as the offer of the assured was made at Erode. Undoubtedly the making of an offer may be part of the cause of action in a suit upon a contract which has resulted fro