Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

1. My learned brother has fully dealt with the facts and the points of law involved in these Second Appeals. I add a few words in my own language out of respect to the strenuous arguments advanced by the appellants learned Vakil.

2. Having regard to the observations in the case reported in Bhadrayya v. Bapayya (1909) 21 M.L.J. 803 and Lakshmi Narasimha Row v. Seetaramaswami (1913) 24 M.L.J. 288 Venkata Narasimha Appa Row v. Subba Reddi (1912) 24 M.L.J.655 Narasimhacharyalu v. Ramabrahmam (1912) 24 M.L.J 656, Veerabadra v. Sonti Venkanna (1913) 24 M.L.J. 659, and to the Judgment in Appeal No. 437 of 1908 and S.A. No. 168 of 1912, I think that no distinction should be made between an Inamdar and a Zemindar as to the presumption to be raised in respect of the kudivaram right in lands of which the Inamdar or the Zemindar is the proprietor. In other words the presumption ought to be that the Inamdar or the Zemindar is not the owner of the kudivaram. There are, no doubt, some observations in the cases of Indety China Nagadu v. Potu Konchi Venkatasubbayya (1910) M.W.N. 639 and Marapu Tharalu v. Telukula Neelakanta Behara (1907) I.L.R. 30 M. 502, which favour the appellants contention. But the authority of those cases can no longer be relied on having regard to the uniform tendency of the later decisions. The distinction made in oneof the two cases between the presumption to be drawn where the jurisdiction of the civil courts will be ousted if the Inamdar is held not to own the kudivaram, and the presumption to be drawn if no such question of jurisdiction arises in the suit, seems to me (with the greatest respect) a little too fine and far-fetched.

3. The other contention of the appellants that an Inamdar could acquire the kudivaram through abandonment or surrender by the tenant of the holding and that, when he so acquires it, the holding ceases to be a part of the Inam estate, has caused me much more anxiety before I could arrive at a decision satisfactory to my mind. The exception to Section 8 uses the general expression " the kudivaram interest has been or is acquired by the Inamdar."

4. Mr. Ramesams argument is that, as it is an exception to Section 8 the modes of acquisition mentioned in the preceding clauses of Section 8 ought to be looked into to find out what the meaning of " acquired" is as used in the exception. These preceding clauses speak of acquisition by transfer, succession or otherwise. And, according to the decisions of the Calcutta High Court on the corresponding section of the Bengal Tenancy Act, See Bactan Chandra Das v. Rajeswari Debya (1905) 2 C.L.J. 570 and Muktakeshi Dasiv Pulin Behary Singh (1909) 8 C.L.J. 324 This does not include acquistion by mere abondonment or surrender. Again, Section 6 Clause 2 of the Estates Land Act is as follows: "Where land held by a ryot with a permanent right of occupancy, is surrendered or abandoned or save in the case falling within... the exception to 8, comes into the possession of the landholder." This shows that the exception to Section 8 which relates to acquisition of the kudivaram right by the land-holder is distinguished from the case where the land-holder gets power to deal with the land through surrender or abandonment by the tenant, in other words, a right got by the landlord through surrender or abandonment of a holding is put under a different category from a right to kudivaram acquired under the exception to Section 8.

5. As the appellants possession of some of the lands during an occasional year or two arose out of surrender and abandonment and not alienation or succession derived from the tenant, the exception to Section 8 cannot be relied upon, and the contention that those lands should be part of the estate therefore fails.

6. As these suits, on the above conclusions, have to be brought in the Revenue court, the plaints in the suits will be returned to the plaintiffs to be returned to the proper court. The costs up to date must be paid by