The time taken by way of claim proceedings, a subsequent suit and an appeal should all enure to the benefit of the decree-holder who is seeking to execute his decree, as these proceedings are a continuation of the execution proceedings.

JUDGMENT:- This appeal is against the order of the learned District Judge, Salem, setting aside the order of the District Munsif, Dharmapuri, holding that the execution application No. R. E. P. 642 of 1952 in O. S. No. 43 of 1945 was in time, and not barred by the law of limitation.

2. Two points arise for consideration in this appeal. The first is that from a perusal of the records it is found that the appeal preferred by the judgment-debtors against the order of the learned District Munsif was not competent in that it was filed 24 days after the time for the appeal had expired. The order of the learned District Munsif was passed on the 20th March 1953. An application for certified copy of the decree was made on the 30th March 1953. But this application was not proceeded with, and it was dismissed and struck off. Another application was filed on the 22nd April 1953, for the certified copy of the judgment and decree. Even this application was not proceeded with, and it was also struck off. A third application was filed on the 14th May 1953, for a certified copy of the decree and judgment, and on this application action was taken and copies were duly supplied. It is after obtaining copies under this application dated 14th May 1953, that the appeal itself was presented as late as 12th June 1953. When these dates are kept in view, obviously the appeal preferred on the 12th June 1953, was out of time. It is curious that neither the office nor the District Judge who dealt with the first appeal, ever noticed that the appeal was out of time. The appeal was, however, heard and disposed of, against which the present appellant has since preferred this C. M. S. Appeal.

3. If the appeal against which this second appeal has been preferred was thus incompetent, the second appeal also becomes incompetent, and both deserve to be dismissed, as not being of any legal validity. If the appeal before the learned District Judge and also the second appeal before this Court are dismissed, then the parties have to be relegated to the position in which they stood as on the 20th of March 1953. when the learned District Munsif passed the order holding that the execution petition in question was in time. I wanted to adopt this course, but the learned counsel for the respondent argues that the adoption of this course will place him in a very prejudicial position, and his suggestion is that the matter should be remanded to the lower appellate Court for investigating into the question of the competency of the appeal, and then give a finding. The learned counsel thinks that such a procedure would give him certain legal reliefs or remedies which he is not able to explain to me or convince me about.

4. However that be, even on the merits I do not think that any relief could be given to the respondent in this appeal. The last order was passed on the 20th April 1948, in E. P. No. 318 of 1947. The order in that execution petition was to the effect that it was dismissed, but above the record showing this order, there is an endorsement. It is not known by whom the endorsement has been made, because it is in a different ink and in different handwriting from that in which the relevant order appears on the docket sheet. This is to the effect that delivery was not effected as the petitioner was absent. In all probability, this endorsement is the result of the return by the bailiff who had been issued the warrant (for delivery of the property) for execution. It will not be wrong to assume that on the basis of this return of the bailiff, endorsed by some person or other on the docket, the learned District Munsif dismissed the application. But what is material is only the order dismissing the application.

5. It is sought to be construed by the learned counsel for the respondent that this order is a final order, and therefore, the bar of limitation should apply to it if any further application tor execution is not filed within a period of three years thereafter. I cann