SupremeToday Landscape Ad
Back
Next
Judicial Analysis Court Copy Headnote Facts Arguments Court observation
Listen Audio Icon Pause Audio Icon
judgment-img

1959 Supreme(Mad) 46

MADRAS HIGH COURT
RAMACHANDRA IYER
Kazimi
Versus
K. M. Sheriff
Petn. No. 30 of 1957
Decided On : 23 March, 1959

Advocates Appeared:
T. Venkatadri, for Petitioner; Addl. Govt. Pleader and B. Lakshminarayana Reddi, for Respondents.

The definition of the term "factory" in the Payment of Wages Act should be read consistent with the definition of the same term in the Factories Act, of 1948.

Headnote:

PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT - FACTORY - DEFINITION - INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE - REPEAL AND RE-ENACTMENT - JURISDICTION OF COMMISSIONER FOR WORKMENS COMPENSATION.

Fact of the Case:

The petitioner, who was running a restaurant called Lucky Cafe in Avanashi Road, Coimbatore, purchased, on 1-11-1955, the goodwill and all other lights in a hotel. Davey and Co. near the railway station, which included a bakery as well. The first respondent was one of the employee in Davey and Co. According to the first respondent, his services were continued by the petitioner. The former was, however, discharged from service on 10-2-1956. Claiming that he was entitled to arrears of wages on the foot of a monthly salary of Rs. 175, the first respondent filed an application before the second respondent for an order, directing the payment of the amount claimed under Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the definition of the term "factory" in the Payment of Wages Act should be read consistent with the definition of the same term in the Factories Act, of 1948, the employment of ten workmen would bring the premises in the category of factory and a manufacturing process would be deemed to have been made there. It, therefore, follows that the second respondent had jurisdiction to entertain the claim, and that there is no case for the issue of a writ of certiorari.

Issues: Whether the definition of the term "factory" as given in the Factories Act of 1948 should be deemed to have been incorporated in the definition of the term "factory" in Sec. 2(i) of the payment of Wages Act even before the amendment of the latter Act in 1957.

Ratio Decidendi: The court relied on the principles of incorporation by reference and repeal and re-enactment to hold that the definition of the term "factory" in the Payment of Wages Act should be read consistent with the definition of the same term in the Factories Act, of 1948.

Final Decision: Petition dismissed with costs.

Judgement

ORDER :- This is an application for the issue of a writ of certiorari, calling for the records in P. W. case No. 174 of 1956 on the file of the Commissioner for Workmens Compensation, Madras, and quashing the order of the Commissioner, for Workmens Compensation, dated 7th December 1956, whereby a sum of Rs. 253 towards arrears of wages and a further sum of Rs. 12 as costs were awarded to the first respondent as against the petitioner. The petitioner, who was running a restaurant called Lucky Cafe in Avanashi Road, Coimbatore, purchased, on 1-11-1955, the goodwill and all other lights in a hotel. Davey and Co. near the railway station, which included a bakery as well. The first respondent was one of the employee in Davey and Co. According to the first respondent, his services were continued by the petitioner. The former was, however, discharged from service on 10-2-1956. Claiming that he was entitled to arrears of wages on the foot of a monthly salary of Rs. 175, the first respondent filed an application before the second respondent for an order, directing the payment of the amount claimed under Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The claim was contested by the petitioner both on the grounds that the second respondent had no jurisdiction and that the first respondent was not entitled to the relief prayed for. The second respondent substantially upheld the claim of the first respondent, and after making a deduction of Rs. 272 already advanced by the petitioner, directed him to pay the first respondent the amounts aforesaid. The petitioner has come forward with this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution to quash the order of the second respondent.

2. On behalf of the petitioner it is urged that Davey and Co., was not a factory, and, that, therefore, there was no jurisdiction in the second respondent to entertain an application under Sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act at the instance of an employee or ex-employee therein. There was some contest before second respondent as to the exact number of persons that were employed in Davey and Co. The finding of the fact arrived by the second respondent was that ten persons were working in that company. Therefore, the only question that was argued in this court was as to whether the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, could properly be invoked by the first respondent to obtain relief against the petitioner.

3. Section 1(4) of the Payment of Wages Act (Act IV of 1936) states that it applies in the first instance to the payment of wages to the persons employed in any factory and to certain other persons specified in that sub-section. Sec 3 of the Act declares that every employer shall be responsible for the payment to persons employed by him of all wages required to be paid under the Act. Sec. 15 of the Act states that the State Government may, by notification, appoint any Commissioner for Workmens compensation or other officer having judicial experience to be the Authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of deduction from the wages, or delay in payment of the wages, of persons employed or paid in that area. Under Sec. 2(1) of the Act the word "factory" is defined as follows :-

"factory means a factory as defined in clause (i) of Sec 2 of the Factories Act, 1934."

Clause (i) of Sec. 2of the Factories Act of 1934, defines factory thus :-

"factory means any premises including the precincts thereof whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process being carried en with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on."

It is necessary for the purpose of appreciating the contention in the present case to ascertain the meaning of the terms "power" and "manufacturing process". "Manufacturing process" is defined in S.2(g) of the Act thus :

(2)(g) "Manufacturing process" means any process -

(i) for making, altering, repairing, ornamenting, finishing or packing, or o
























Click Here to Read the rest of this document

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
SupremeToday Portrait Ad
supreme today icon
logo-black

An indispensable Tool for Legal Professionals, Endorsed by Various High Court and Judicial Officers

Please visit our Training & Support
Center or Contact Us for assistance

qr

Scan Me!

India’s Legal research and Law Firm App, Download now!

For Daily Legal Updates, Join us on :

whatsapp-icon Back to top