Prior sanction only a condition for institution of the suit.

RARUCKAHDRA IYER, C.J. :- The sole question that arises for determination in this appeal against the judgment of Rajagopalan, J. is whether an order of the Wakf Board constituted under Act XXIX of 1954 (The Wakf Act, 1954) granting permission to certain relators to institute a suit, can be regarded as amounting to the performance of a quasi judicial duty so as to be subject to the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned Judge this judgment is reported in Abdul Kasim v. Mohamad Dawood, 73 Mad LW 649 : (AIR 1961 Mad 244) has answered that question in the negative. Hence this appeal.

2. The appellants are three among the six trustees of Annural Muhamniadiyah Madrasa Trust which is being administered under a scheme framed by this Court. Respondents 1 to 7 to this appeal claiming to be interested in the institution and complaining of breaches of trust on the part of the trustees and also alleging that directions of the Court were necessary to amend the existing schema approached and obtained from the Advocate General, Madras sanction for filing a suit for reliefs coming under S. 92, C. P. Code. The trust being a muslim wakf, a further sanction was necessary under S. 55(2) of the Wakf Act, 1954 from the Wakf Board. They accordingly applied for the same. The Wakf Board consists of ten members, one of them is a trustee of Annural Mahamadiyah Madrasa itself, he has been impleaded as a defendant to the proposed suit. He is the 8th respondent to this appeal. The Full Board met on 19-12-1959 when the question of according sanction to the trust came up for consideration. The Chairman of the Board who is a well-known advocate of this Court presumably thought that the matter was one for judicial consideration and disposal. Nothing material except directing the trustee to file within a date specified counter statements, if any, was done that day. At the further meetings of the Board when the matter came up, the 8th respondent was excluded from the deliberations of the Board. The rest of the members alone enquired into the matter; the Board even heard counsel thus adopting all the semblance of judicial procedure. At the conclusion of the enquiry it granted its consent in writing for the institution of the suit.

3. The appellants complain that the 8th respondent represented a faction among the trustees which is antagonistic to them and although he was ostensibly excluded, he was influencing and guiding the deliberations of the Board at all material times, sitting behind a screen in the very room where the Board met. This, it is said, is opposed to the fundamental principle of judicial procedure, namely, that no person shall be a judge of his own cause. On those allegations the appellants-filed an application to this Court under Art 226 of the Constitution to issue a writ of certiorari; to quash the order of the Wakf Board granting sanction.

4. Both the Wakf Board and the other respondents have denied the factual background to the petition; they also contend that a consent given by the Board under S. 55 of the Act for the institution of a suit is not a justiciable matter.

5. If the matter were to be decided on the materials on record we would have very little hesitation in accepting the affidavits filed by the Chairman of the Wakf Board, rejecting what appears to be a fantastic story about the 8th respondents participation at the meeting of the Wakf Board from behind a screen. 6. But it has become unnecessary to adopt that course as the case was decided by Rajagopalan, J. on a question of jurisdiction, that being the only point argued in the appeal. What then arises for consideration is whether this Court can by way of certiorari call upon the Wakf Board to produce its records with a view to quash its orders under S. 55(2) of the Act. The conditions to be satisfied before this Court can do so have been enunciated in the classic passage in the judgment of Atkin, L.J. in King v. Electricity Commrs., 1924-1 K