The main legal point established in the judgment is the limited power of a Hindu father, while unseparated from his son, to alienate ancestral estate and self-acquired property, subject to specific conditions and purposes.

Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J. (Innes, Kindersly and Muttusami Ayyar, JJ.)

1. The question referred in this appeal is, whether a Hindu father, while unseparated from his son, has power to alienate to a stranger his self-acquired moveable estate, and his undivided share in the ancestral estate, moveable and immoveable.

2. It may be admitted that some passages in the Mitakshara, respecting the fathers power of alienation, are apparently conflicting; nevertheless they may be reconciled, and, when reconciled, are in agreement with the dicta of other commentators to whom reference is made as of authority in Southern India.

3. To understand the subject, it is necessary to bear in mind the distinction which Hindu lawyers recognized between the ownership of, and dominion over, property, which distinction is clearly declared in relation to the question now under consideration by Devanda Bhatta in a passage to which I shall presently refer.

4. In discussing the question, whether partition is the cause of property or the ascertainment of an existing right, the author of the Mitakshara (Section V) deals first with the argument of the objector. Property is by partition; if it arose on birth, the father could not maintain a sacrificial fire, nor perform other religious acts which require wealth for their accomplishment. Nor could the prohibition be maintained which exempts from partition gains of valour and secures the property of a wife and property acquired by the fathers favour. Moreover, the text of Vishnu respecting affectionate gifts shows that a father may give his wife even immoveable property. The texts, The father is master of the gems, &c, but neither the father nor grandfather is so of the whole immoveable estate," "By favour of the father, clothes and ornaments are used, but immoveable property may not be consumed even with the fathers indulgence," which forbid a gift of property through favour, the objector asserts, relate to the grand-fathers property, on whose death the moveables belong exclusively to the father, while the immoveable estate descends to the father and son in common. Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section I, Sections 18--22. The author replies the acquisition of ownership by birth is generally recognized in accordance with the text of Gautama. As to the text cited The father is master of the gems, it would have been unnecessary to declare this, if property were not acquired by birth; the text, moreover, applies to the immoveable property of the father as well as of the grandfather, for both father and grandfather are declared not to be masters of the whole immoveable estate. This maxim, that the grandfathers own acquisition should not be given away while a grandson is living, indicates a proprietary interest by birth; as for the opinion advanced that precious stones, &c, belong to the father by reason of the text cited, it is admitted, on the authority of that text, he has power to give them away (it is explained afterwards for what purposes). As for the text of Vishnu, the immoveable property therein mentioned is the self-acquired property of the father, given with the consent of the sons : the fitness of any moveable property to be the subject of an affectionate gift is certain. As for the suggested impediment to the performance of religious duties, the injunction to perform them authorizes the employment of property of any kind. Therefore, "it is a settled point that property in the paternal and ancestral estate is by birth [although] the father has independent power in the disposal of effects other than immoveables for indispensable acts of duty, and for purposes prescribed by texts of law but he is subject to the control of his sons and the rest in regard to the immoveable estate, whether acquired by himself or inherited from his father or other predecessor. "Mitakshara, Chapter I, Section V, Sections 23--27.

5. The author intimates that in respect of the right by birth to the estate, paternal or ancestral, he