The burden of proof for establishing occupancy rights lies with the party claiming such rights, and historical leases and agreements, as well as the conduct of the parties, are crucial in determining the existence of such rights.

1. The appellants, defendants, are the cultivating ryots of Periyakurvadi, a village in the District of Tanjore, and the respondents, plaintiffs, are trustees of Rajagopalaswamis temple at Mannargudi in the same District. It is admitted that the miras of the village is in the name of the temple and that the annual payment made by the appellants to the respondents is made both on account of the melvaram (Government share of the produce) and of mirasvaram (proprietors share of the produce). The village in suit is not then of the class of villages in which the temple endowment is limited, to the melvaram right. It is also not disputed that Periyakuruvadi is a taraf or assessed village and that, although no assessment is now paid, it is be cause of the recent assignment of the revenue due on the village in lieu of the annual money allowance paid by Government to the temple. It is clear, therefore, that the village was not one originally granted as inam for the support of the temple. We must take it then to, be an ordinary taraf or assessed village registered in the Collectors books in the name of the temple as its proprietor or mirasidar.

2. The appellants case was the temple was never entitled to, and that the trustees or panchayatdars never had actual possession of the Village and that the appellants had the kudikani or occupancy right from time immemorial. Ordinarily the mirasidar or proprietor in a taraf village has the right of cultivation also and he is therefore at liberty to arrange for it from time to time either by granting leases, of letting it to purakudies for varam or under what is usually called the pannai system by means of labourers who are paid wages in grain. The respondents stated in their plaint that appellants 1, 7, 9 and the fathers of 8 and 10 obtained a lease from the temple for 6 faslis from 1287 to 1292 on the 29th September 1877, that appellants 11 to 68 cultivated lands in the village together with the lessees, their relatives, and that, although the lease has expired, all the appellants wrongfully held over and declined to restore possession of the village. The plaint prayed for possession of 69 and odd velies of land together with their appurtenances, and for the recovery of Rupees 4,637-3-6, being the rent due for fasli1292 together with the sum of Rupees 30 which was said to be the value of produce realized by the appellants in fasli 1293. Apart from the occupancy light asserted by the appellants, they resisted the claim also on several other grounds, and the issues recorded for decision by the Subordinate Judge sufficiently indicate the several matters in contest in this suit. The Subordinate Judge found all the issues in favour of the respondents and decreed the claim. The appellants object to the decree on several grounds.

3. The first objection taken in appeal is that the onus of proving the occupancy right is not on the appellants as observed by the Subordinate Judge. Admittedly the village in suit is a taraf village of which the temple is the registered proprietor entitled both to the melvardm and the mirasvaram as against the appellants. This being so, the claim of an occupancy right as overriding the proprietors right to cultivate his own land is of a special character, and as such it is one which the party, seeking to derogate from the ordinary incident of property, is bound to establish. Of course the appellants are entitled to the benefit of any presumption which may reasonably arise from the length of enjoyment and other special circumstances of the case. The contention that mere length of enjoyment in the capacity of tenants on purakudies irrespective of other circumstances is prima facie proof of occupancy right, cannot be supported. We shall consider hereafter whether the facts proved in this case give rise to any presumption in favour of the appellants, but we hold that the burden of proof was rightly cast on the appellants. Another objection taken in appeal is that the Sub-Ju