IN THE HIGH COURT OF MARAS
Spencer
Minor Subbarayan By Guardian
Versus
Minor Natarajan By Their Guardian
Decided On : 20 March, 1922
Section 48, C.P.C. - Extension of 12 years period - Sections 15, 29 of the Limitation Act - The court held that the period of 12 years under Section 48, C.P.C. cannot be extended by Section 15 of the Limitation Act. Section 29 of the Limitation Act does not affect the matter. The appeal was allowed, and the execution petition was dismissed as out of time.
Fact of the Case:
The court considered whether the period of 12 years in Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code could be extended by Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the period of 12 years under Section 48, C.P.C. cannot be extended by Section 15 of the Limitation Act.
Issues: The main issue was the interpretation of Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and its relationship with Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the period of 12 years under Section 48, C.P.C. cannot be extended by Section 15 of the Limitation Act. Section 29 of the Limitation Act does not affect the matter.
Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the execution petition was dismissed as out of time.
Spencer, J.
1. In disposing of an execution petition the Sub-Court of Mayavaram in an order passed on April 9th, 1919, which the District Judge of Tanjore confirmed on appeal, extended the period of 12 years after which Section 48, C.P.C. declares that no order for the execution of decree shall be made upon any fresh application. This 12 years period has been extended by the executing Court by the addition of a period equal to that during which a stay of execution of the decree was once obtained by an order of Court in 1913.
2. I am of opinion that this is not permissible by law, and that Section 48, C.P.C. which contains an unqualified prohibition against execution of the decrees more than 12 years old, is not controlled by Section 15 of the Limitation Act, Section 15 of that Act speaks of the computation of periods of limitation with reference to the periods prescribed in schedule to the Act. Though the words "in the schedule" do not occur in this section or in Section 19 as they do in Sections 3 and 6, the word "prescribed" can in applying the Act and to suits under the general law refer to nothing else. This is the meaning given by this Court to the section in Narasimha Deo Garu v. Krishnachandra Deo Garu 10 L.W. 156 at pp. 166 and 167 : 37 M.L.J. 256, and by the Allahabad High Court in Jurawan Pasi v. Mahabir Dhar Dube (1918) I.L.R. 40 All. 198, as explained by Shiam Karan v. The Collector of Benares (1919) I.L.R. 42 ALL. 118. I am aware that Article 181 of schedule speaks of Section 48, C.P.C. as "providing" a period of limitation. But Section 48 has nothing to do with the periods of limitation prescribed in the schedule to the Limitation Act and has no connection with the process of computation of time according to the nature of the cause of action in particular suits. For as may be seen by its position in a Code of Procedure in the part that is headed "Execution" it enacts a rule of procedure for all executing Courts. The effect of that rule is to put an absolute term of 12 years on the right of decree holders to apply to execute their decrees. See the observations of Jwala Prasad, J. in Mahanth Krishna Dayal Gir v. Musst Sakina Bibi (1916) 20 C.W.N. page 952 : 1 P.L.J. 214. The only exceptions to the absolute term fixed by the section are those mentioned in proviso 2 to the section itself. The precise question which we have to decide is, considering its importance, singularly barren of authority, but there is one reported case in Govinda v. Umra Singh (1920) 54 I.C. 279 which accords with the view which in my judgment is most reasonable. In Kumar a Venkataperumal v. Velaynda Reddi (1914) 27 M.L.J. 25. Sadasiva Aiyar, J. was inclined to hold that the general provisions of the Limitation Act relating to exclusion of time governed the provision in Section 48 of the C.P. Code, but the learned Chief Justice did not pronounce an opinion on this point of law, as he refused on the facts of that case to extend the time, without deciding whether it would be legal to do so. On the other hand the decision in Raman a v. Balm (1912) 24 M.L.J. 96 (S.C.) : I.L.R. 37 Mad. 186. is opposed to the opinion of Sadasiva Aiyar, J.
3. Reference has been made in the arguments on both sides to Section 29, Limitation Act.
4. I consider that this section does not affect the matter one way or the other. It relates to special or local laws which contain special provisions of their own for the limitation of certain proceedings taken to obtain reliefs provided therein.
5. It does not include the Civil Procedure Code in its scope.
6. The appeal is allowed with costs throughout and the execution petition is dismissed as out of time.
Ramesam, J.
7. The point for decision in this case is, whether, in computing the period of 12 years in Section 48 of the Civil Procedure Code, Section 15(1) of the Limitation Act can be applied. The question has been ably and exhaustively argued by the Vakils on either side. I confess I find considerable difficulty in comin
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