The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Magistrate is duty-bound to drop proceedings under Section 145 if satisfied that the likelihood of breach of peace does not exist, and that the Magistrate must leave the parties to settle their rights in the manner they think best to do, holding his hands after dropping the proceedings.

Krishnan, J.

1. This is an application to revise certain proceedings passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Masulipatam, in connection with an application filed by the petitioner asking the Magistrate to take action under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Magistrate stating that he was satisfied that there was a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace passed a preliminary order under Section 145 and directed the parties to attend his Court and to file written statements of their respective claims as regards the possession of the subject-matter in dispute. At a subsequent stage, the Magistrate, became satisfied that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace and he, therefore, dropped the proceedings and passed no orders under Section 145 regarding possession of the property.

2. The first point taken before me in revision is that the Magistrate was not entitled to drop proceedings without giving an opportunity to the petitioner to show by evidence that there was a likelihood of the breach of the peace and the Magistrates conclusion that there was no likelihood of the breach of the peace from information received was incorrect. It is contended that, without an opportunity being given to the parties to show the-existence of the likelihood of the breach of peace, a Magistrate who has started proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, cannot cancel or drop them. This does not seem to me to be the law at all, for, as pointed out in Mahindra Chandra Nandi v. Burada Kanta Chowdhry (1903) ILR 30 C 112, where this very question was raised and considered, "a party to a proceeding under Section 145 is not in the position of a plaintiff in a civil suit who has set the Court in motion and has a right to require a decision upon the questions raised by him. If a Magistrate either refuses to make an order under Sub-section (1) of Section 145, or having made such an order, subsequently cancels it on the ground that a dispute does not exist likely to cause a breach of the peace, no private person has any status to contest the propriety of his refusal to make an enquiry into the question of possession." It must be borne in mind that proceedings under Section 145 are not taken in the interests or private parties but for the preservation of the public peace and if the Magistrate is satisfied that the likelihood of the breach of the peace either did not exist or that it has ceased to exist, it is the proper duty of the Magistrate to drop proceedings under Section 145 and withdraw from interfering with the rights of parties in the property. The case in Manindra Chandra Nandi v. Barada Kanta Chowdhry (1902) ILR 30 C 112 in which this very question was raised and decided by a Bench of that Court Calcutta High--Court is against the contention now raised by the petitioner. That ruling has been followed in this Court by Spencer, J. in Suryanarayana v. Rajah Ankineed Prasad (1924) ILR 47 M 713 : 46 MLJ 565 and I am prepared to take the same view. I do not think it is open to a party to come up here and say that the Magistrate had no business to drop proceedings on the ground that there was no likelihood of a breach of the peace without giving him an opportunity to show that there was such a likelihood. It is the Magistrate s duty to be satisfied that there is no breach of peace in his district. If he is so satisfied, it is not for a private party to object. Clause (1922) 17 LW 429 of Section 145 provides for a special case where as the Magistrate is proceeding with the trial of the question of possession, the parties to the proceedings or even other persons who are interested are given the right to show that no dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace exists or has existed. The existence of this clause does not take away the power of the Magistrate himself to drop proceedings if he is satisfied that there is no further likelihood of the breach of the peace. The first objection therefore fails.

3. The main poi